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JAPAN'S ADVENTURE IN CHINA

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JAPAN'S ADVENTURE IN CHINA

A Critical Analysis of the Tsinan Incident

By

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
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PREFACE

The life of any nation is like that of an individual, which goes through successive epochs of health and sickness, fortunes and misfortunes. The historical events of any single epoch can not and should not be taken as the test of the glory or ill-luck of any particular nation, for the life of any nation is an everlasting continuous process, while any epoch under the observation of any particular individual must be necessarily short. The events that have taken place in any given period can only be accounted for under the light of that particular epoch, for the development of all historical events has certain causes and relations with the environment of the epoch or epochs in question.

Whatever misfortune China may be going through at the present time under the unwise guidance of some of her leaders, nevertheless, the results of such temporary unwise leadership cannot be interpreted as characteristic of Chinese history alone. The rise or fall, progress or retrogression of a nation, is a universal characteristic. A brief mishap in the life of any nation is nothing but inevitable and normal. It is

only the superficial observer who troubles himself by yelling out all the unnecessary dogmatic remarks. This is indeed stupid and unadvisable.

There is no doubt that many of the present day ills of China are due to her own fault,—the ignorance of her masses and the inefficiency and lack of foresight of her leaders. In many respects, China is still a mediaeval country, in habits, customs, modes of living, as well as in thought. In view of this fact, she cannot meet her powerful neighbors readily concerning the various problems of international relations. First of all, she does not know the tricks and ethics of modern diplomacy, the intricacies of international finance, the relationship between capitalistic production and colonial expansion, and other complicated aspects of modern internationalism. Then her system of education, until recent years, was only of the mediaeval classical formal type, which aims, not to produce an intelligent public, but to produce a class of gentlemen rulers. A mediaeval system of formal education to produce modern leaders, leaders to meet the modern complicated national and international problems, is indeed, nothing but fatal.

Since China is still mediaeval in many respects, naturally the social, economic, and intellectual level of her people cannot reach the same standard as that of her powerful neighbors. There should be no doubt that China's problem is both economic and intellectual: her masses are underfed and underclad as well as ignorant. So in order to transform China into a modern country, the improvement of the means and facilities of livelihood as well as the education of the masses, are the two most urgent needs of the country.

Instead of taking proper steps to raise the status of the masses of the country both materially and intellectually, certain Chinese leaders have adopted a wrong method by inducing China's hungry and ignorant crowds to commit certain emotional acts against both her own institutions and those of other nations. The omnipotent crowd has been proved by social psychologists to be only a destructive factor, yet these Chinese leaders do not see this principle and still adhere to their outworn theory of the omnipotent power of their God—the crowd, which results in great calamity to both her own people and the people of other nations residing within the

country. This unwise policy of certain Chinese leaders is certainly unfortunate to all concern.

It is, indeed, very unfortunate, that many of China's leaders due to their insufficient training and consequent lack of foresight, do not perceive these problems clearly, and instead of attempting to solve these fundamental problems, they do something quite different; and in most instances through their own fault in trying to bring up their country to a modern standard, they only help some of her powerful neighbors to gain further advantages in their country by creating opportunities for them. If the Chinese leaders were more efficient and have more foresight, it is safe to say, many of these complicated international "incidents" would have been avoided, in spite of the ever eagerness of some of her powerful neighbors to look for opportunities to gain advantages, or to create "incidents." Why not these leaders avoid these unhappy conditions when they can do so? Why do they let some of their ambitious neighbors take advantage of the situations they have created? Why not they follow the line of least resistance in their activities, instead

of trying to remove the hardest and biggest obstacles in their efforts to work for the welfare of their country? This is no doubt due to their lack of foresight and ability to plan out their activities beforehand. On the other hand, this lack of planning, in most cases, is due to their insufficient training to handle the tasks that are being entrusted to them.

This condition is indeed unfortunate; but is ignorance a sin? weakness a crime? should the stupid be crushed? These are some of the questions for students of national and international politics to consider. Below is presented a critical analysis of the recent Tsinan Incident, a presentation of the conditions and problems, which have given rise to, and the consequent effects of, this Incident.

Whoever might have started the first blow in the recent Tsinan Incident, and whatever might have been the cause for the first blow to happen, it is immaterial. Most of the printed matters appeared in the Chinese and foreign press concerning this question only cover the consequences and other unimportant minor issues. The fundamental issue in the Tsinan Incident is the legality or otherwise

of the landing of Japanese troops in Shantung. If we expect to solve this problem at all, this fundamental issue must, first of all, be cleared; otherwise there would be no clear cut solution to the whole problem. If Japan is justified in sending troops to Shantung, then the minor issues—the clash at Tsinan on the 3rd of May between the Japanese army of occupation and the Chinese Nationalist revolutionary forces, the later bombardment of the walled city of Tsinan, the occupation of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad, the destruction of the railroad bridge on the Yellow River, the murder of the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tsai Kung-shih and other such events, will be easy to solve. On the other hand, if Japan's invasion of Shantung is unlawful, then it is inevitable and conclusive that she is responsible for the whole incident. It is the purpose of this small book to analyse the whole incident with a critical spirit. Whether this analysis is right or wrong, the readers may draw their own conclusions. This book is in no way an appeal to justice or to solicit help for China's cause, it only attempts to stimulate international thought among both Chinese and foreign readers. It is the writer's conviction that justice is a human creation,

a creation of human emotions and the military force under the command of man rather than of his intellect. The appeal of the weak is never heard, and the argument of the strong is always effective. So, what's the use to cry for international justice when there is none?

YU TINN-HUGH

Shanghai, July 1928.

CONTENTS

Chapters	Pages
I A Chapter on Recent Japanese History	1
II The Rape on Korea	12
III The Economic Background of Japan's Activities in China	19
IV Japan's Foreign Policy ...	24
V The Twenty-one Demands ...	35
VI Japan's Position in Man- churia	42
VII Japan in Shantung	73
VIII Prelude to the Tsinan Incident	105
IX The Tsinan Incident	111
X The Murder of Chang Tso-lin	134
XI The Japanese News Service and the Incident... ...	153
XII The Legal Aspects of the Tsinan Incident	158
XIII The Attitude China Should Adopt Toward the Tsi- nan Incident	164
XIV Conclusion	168

APPENDIX

Appendix I	Pages
Declaration made by Count Okuma to the United States on August 15, 1914	170
Japanese Ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914	170
Declaration made by Count Okuma to the United States on August 24, 1914	170
Statement of Vice-Minister of the Navy Suzuki, November 7, 1914...	171
Appendix II	
Japanese Population in China ...	172
Appendix III	
How the Tsinan Clash Started ...	174
The Japanese Bombardment...	174
Appendix IV	
Press Comments on the Shantung Affair	187
Appendix V	
Pertinent Facts about Shantung Province	200
Appendix VI	
Some Japanese Documents relating to the Tsinan Incident	206

JAPAN'S ADVENTURE IN CHINA

CHAPTER I

A CHAPTER ON RECENT JAPANESE HISTORY

Since the compulsory opening up of the hermit kingdom of Japan to world trade by the American Commander Perry during the middle part of the last century, the Japanese people have been very active in imitating the arts and sciences of the European countries. As a consequence, in the course of half of a century, Japan was able to wage two successful wars against her once powerful neighbors, China and Russia.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan has tried her best to equip herself with every possible means to cope with the European Powers. Her attention to national problems was twofold, one was to equip and arm herself to resist whatever invasion from without, and the other was to develop herself externally by following the line of least resistance toward foreign lands.

These two aspects of Japan's national ambition can easily be seen in her wonderful industrial and economic achievements since the latter part of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, her ambition towards foreign lands is also very apparent, and mostly achieved at the expense of her sleeping ancient neighbor, China.

Japan as a nation, and the Japanese as a people, know China and the Chinese thoroughly well, for since the days of their national reformation the Japanese people have been looking for opportunities to develop abroad, and China being the nearest and best field for this movement, they unanimously considered her as their field for exploitation, colonization, and expansion.

The first act of aggression that Japan has committed toward China was the annexation of the Islands of Liu Kiu, a chain of small islands situated on the East China Sea, south of the Japanese Island of Kiushiu. The kingdom of the Liu Kiu Islands was a protectorate of the Chinese Empire since the days of the Tang Dynasty. About 1870, some Liu Kiu Islanders wandering in Formosa were killed by the native aborigines of the latter Island. Later some

Japanese subjects were also thus murdered. In view of this event, Japan, under the pretext of protecting her subjects, sent an expedition into Formosa, and then demanded indemnity from China for undertaking the work of suppressing these aborigines; but at the same time she annexed the Liu Kiu Islands under the pretext of defending the Liu Kiu people from the attack of the Formosan aborigines. After this incident took place, China demanded that Japan should renounce her claim to these islands, but she refused and has retained them ever since. In spite of this, China, although did not recognize Japan's claim, was never strong enough to resume her authority over them again.

The next step of Japan's aggression on her sleeping ancient neighbor was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, which was started through Japan's ambition to annex Korea, another protectorate of the former Chinese Empire.

About the same time when she annexed the Islands of Liu Kiu, Japan approached the Chinese authorities to discuss the Chinese position in Korea and suggested that China should not interfere with the diplomatic problems of Korea. Following this, Japan

then approached the Korean authorities to make a treaty to the effect that she recognizes Korea as an independent Kingdom, treats her as an equal, and requested Korea to open several of her seaports to Japanese trade. Following this, the other Powers came one by one to demand similar rights from Korea, and so treaties were entered into between Korea and England, America, Germany, Russia, and France. As a consequence, China gradually lost her sovereignty over Korea through these various treaties.

After this incident had happened, the enlightened part of the Korean population began to split itself into the pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese parties. Shortly after, the pro-Japanese faction assassinated a minister of the pro-Chinese faction, and with the military assistance from Japan, it attempted to compel the King of Korea to submit to its wishes.

At that time, Yuan Shih-kai who was Chinese commissioner of trade at Seoul, urgently appealed to the home Government to send a force to suppress this insurrection. In the meantime Japan had entered into negotiations with the Chinese statesman, Li Hung-chang, at Tientsin to the effect that the forces of the two countries should be

withdrawn within four months, and let the King of Korea to manage the affairs of his own country, but in case of further trouble arising in Korea the two countries would take joint action to send forces there again. Under this agreement, China had granted away one half of her rights in Korea to Japan.

In 1894, there was rebellion again in Korea, and the King of that country once more requested the Chinese Government to send a force there to put down the rebellion. Acting under this request, the Chinese Government immediately sent some of her cruisers to the Korean ports on the one hand, and requested Japan to take similar action on the other.

Within a few days after the landing of a joint force in Korea, the rebellion was put down, so the Chinese Government again requested the Japanese Government to withdraw its forces jointly. But this time, Japan not only did not withdraw her troops but in a few days' time there were more than ten thousand additional Japanese troops landed in Korea, and the King of Korea was also captured by them.

In spite of these hostile actions committed by Japan, China was not at all prepared for a clash, so Li Hung-chang advocated peace. But in the meantime, the Japanese forces had already occupied the important places throughout Korea. Up to that time, the real aim of Japan was more than clearly expressed out, so a war between China and Japan was officially declared on the 27th day of the Sixth Moon.

As Japan was well prepared for the act, so both her army and navy were ordered to attack the Chinese forces on both land and sea; and within a very short period, the Chinese navy was crushed, and the Chinese army defeated. In addition, the Chinese ports along the northern sea coasts were occupied by the Japanese forces.

In view of this surprising defeat, the Chinese Government sent Li Hung-chang to Japan to negotiate peace. When Li Hung-chang arrived Japan, he was attacked and severely injured by a Japanese mob. As Japan had defeated China severely, she refused to negotiate peace; but in view of the malicious attack by the Japanese assassins on the life of the Chinese

plenipotentiary, it was considered to be a gross violation of international law, and so Japan was compelled by circumstances to concede certain points, and offered her apology to the Chinese plenipotentiary. Following this event, negotiations were then started to stop the war.

The essential points stipulated in the treaty to end the war are as follows, 1. Henceforth Korea shall be an independent nation and stop sending tributes to China; 2. China shall pay Japan an indemnity of \$200,000,000; 3. The Liaotung Peninsula (Southern extreme limit of Manchuria), Formosa, and the Pescades Islands shall be ceded to Japan; 4. The ports of Chungking, Shasi, Soochow, and Hangchow shall be opened to international trade.

The prestige of China was greatly depreciated through this severe defeat, and she had to submit to any terms that were dictated to her. In view of the sudden rise of Japan as a new factor in Far Eastern politics, the Western Powers were greatly agitated, and Russia took advantage of this situation to force Japan to relinquish her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula. To this act, Japan complied, and the next year, a

new treaty was made between Japan and China stating that (1) Japan shall return the Liaotung Peninsula to China, and (2) in lieu of ceding this Peninsula, China shall indemnify Japan another \$30,000,000.

Following the defeat of 1894, China could no longer hold her own, and so after this incident, the only thing she could do was to submit to whatever demands the Powers might present to her. Thus, the demands for leaseholds were dictated to her, and the ports of Wei-hei-wei, Kiaochow, Kwangchowan, and other places were leased to the respective Powers for varying periods. As a result, Russia was also granted the lease to the seaports of Dairen and Port Arthur for a period of twenty-five years.

It was the lease of these two ports to Russia that instigated the next great incident in Far Eastern politics, the Russo-Japanese War. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan felt that she could have a free hand to affairs in China, but she soon found out that there were enemies surrounding her who frequently interfered with her activities in China. The most apparent enemy among the group was undoubtedly Russia, who prevented her from taking possession of the Liaotung Peninsula but

later occupied the same by herself. In view of this, Japan determined to go one step further, and attempted to crush Russia in the battlefield, which she did in 1904.

As a result of this Russo-Japanese War, the Liaotung Peninsula was retaken by Japan, and in addition, the southern half of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, from Chang-chun to Dairen, was also ceded to her.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan's only competitor of great significance in China was England, who was shrewd and powerful, so instead of trying to compete with her openly, she played a double game, by openly seeking an alliance with England, and at the same time secretly competing with her. On the other hand, England knew quite well that she needed Japan's assistance in some of her own activities in the Far East, so an alliance between the two was formed.

After Japan has thus gained her dominant position in the Far East, she formally annexed Korea in 1908 in violation of the various treaties which she had made with the Powers concerning the guarantee of the integrity and independence of this little Far Eastern Kingdom. But international justice can only be obtained

through the sword, and so this international crime was recorded in the history of the world without any protest from any quarter.

Following the annexation of Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railroad, and the Island of Formosa, Japan has secured a special position in Manchuria and the Chinese province of Fukien.

Then during the European War, she occupied the port of Tsingtao by an attack from the rear through Chinese territory, in violation of the sovereign rights of China. Following this, she occupied the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad, and certain mines and salt fields in Shantung. During that time, the Great Powers were busily engaged in a life and death struggle, and had no time to look into the matter, so this unlawful incident was allowed to pass by without any act taken by any particular nation, except a few useless protests from the Chinese authorities. It was this occupation of the Shantung Peninsula in 1914 that gave rise to the so-called special Japanese position in Shantung and the starting point of the recent Tsinan Incident.

At the Versailles Conference, Japan, through a double demand presented to the Conference, one concerning racial equality,

and the other the permanent occupation of the Shantung Peninsula, had won a diplomatic victory; concerning the two alternatives, the Powers refused to consider the former, and so Shantung was sacrificed and given to Japan. But China refused to sign a treaty made by others granting away her own territory, and so later, the Washington Conference was called to adjust this matter.

Following the occupation of the Shantung Peninsula, Japan presented to China her notorious "twenty one demands" in the form of an ultimatum.

All the above sections are but a few brief instances from the recent history of Japan. Concerning Japan's special position in Shantung, Manchuria, and the twenty-one demands, special chapters will be devoted below.

CHAPTER II

THE RAPE ON KOREA

In the last chapter reference has already been made concerning the annexation of Korea by Japan, how she first got China's hands off, and then how she herself had stepped in, not only as China's successor, but as conqueror of the country. Below is printed a list of treaties and conventions, which Japan herself had entered into, or were made by the other Powers at the inducement of Japan to guarantee the integrity and independence of Korea.

I Treaty (of Shimonoseki), Japan-China. (At the end of the Sino-Japanese War).

Article 1. "China recognizes definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea."

II Agreement, Japan-Russia—April 25, 1898.

Article 1. "The (two Governments) recognize definitely the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea and pledge themselves mutually to abstain from all

direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.”

III. Treaty, Korea-China -Sept. 11, 1899.

Article 1. “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of China

IV Treaty, England—Japan (making the Anglo—Japanese alliance) Jan. 30, 1902.

Preamble. “The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme east, being, moreover, specially interested in maintaining territorial integrity of the Empire of China and Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree.....”.

Article 1. “The high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country.”

V Convention, France-Russia—March 3, 1902.

The two Governments "have received a copy of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of Jan. 30, 1902, concluded with the object of maintaining the status quo and the general peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all nations....."

"The two governments consider that the observance of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East."

VI Rescript, by the Emperor of Japan, Feb. 10, 1904, declaring war against Russia.

"

"The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to this Empire,... the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm.

"

".....the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the extreme east..... .."

VII Protocol, Japan-Korea—Feb. 23, 1904.

Article 1. "For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration."

Article 2. "The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea "

Article 3. "The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire."

VIII Treaty, Great Britain—August 12, 1905 (renewing alliance).

Article 3. "Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measuresin Korea as she may deem properprovided that such measures are not contrary to the principles of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."

IX Treaty (of Portsmouth), Japan-Russia—Sept. 5, 1905.

Article 2. "The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economic interests, engages neither to obstruct nor to interfere with the measures..... which the Imperial Japanese Government may find it necessary to take in Korea."

X Convention, Japan-Korea—November 17, 1905.

Preamble. The two Governments, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have.....concluded".

Article 1. "The Government of Japanwill hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea.....".

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident General in Korea.

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the Korean Emperor from being given a hearing at the Hague Conference.

XI Convention, Japan-Korea—July 24, 1907.

"The Governments of Japan and Korea desiring speedily to promote the wealth and strength of Korea and with the object of promoting the prosperity of the Korean nation, have agreed"

"1. In all matters relating to the reform of the Korean administration the Korean Government shall receive instructions and guidance from the (Japanese) Resident General"

"4. In all appointments and removals of high officials the Korean Government must obtain the consent of the Resident General.

"5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be officials of Korea any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident General.

"6. The Korean Government shall not appoint any foreigners to be officials of Korea without consulting the Resident General."

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no part of Japan's purpose to annex Korea.

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be "amalgamated" with Japan.

XII Treaty, Japan-Korea — August 22, 1910.

Article 1. "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to his Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea".

Article 2. "His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan."

On August 29, 1910, Japan formally declared Korea annexed to the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Japanese Emperor.

The above resumé of the various treaties made by and between Japan and the other Powers concerning the "independence and integrity" of Korea and the subsequent results to that fateful nation inspite of these various representations of international lies and hypocrisy shows clearly one of the grave modern international crimes of no small magnitude. The above statements also prove by themselves how sincere Japan is in her international declarations and engagements.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF JAPAN'S ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

There is no doubt that the economic deficiency of Japan has a great deal to do with her adventures in the Continent of Asia and elsewhere. On the one hand her population is constantly on the increase, while on the other her economic production cannot keep up with the needs of this growing population; consequently, the search for opportunities abroad to satisfy the endless demands of this growing population arises.

At the time when the country was first opened to foreign trade, the population of Japan was about 30,000,000. During that time, the standard of living of the people was very low. Following the opening up of the country, the virtues as well as the vices of modern European civilization came together to make a joint invasion of the country. Production, no doubt, was increasing slowly, but the population of the country was increasing faster. It is estimated that the population of present day Japan is about

65,000,000, more than double that of the middle part of the last century.

According to Japanese statistics, the population per square mile in the territories under Japanese control are as follows: 2,417 in Japan Proper, 1,346 in Korea, 1,713 in Formosa, 87 in the Island of Saghailen, 4,372 in the Liaotung Peninsula, and 404 in the Japanese Mandatory regions under the League of Nations.

On the other hand, the cultivatable land within the whole Empire in 1880 was about 10,951,500 acres, and in 1925 the number of cultivatable acres has increased to 46,945,000, an increase of approximately about 36%.

In 1927 the estimated amount of rice consumed was 34,264,680, bushels, wheat 5,044,320 bushels, and barley 7,251,360 bushels. The total estimated amount of cereal consumed for the year was 46,560,360 bushels. On the other hand the estimated amount of rice produced in 1925 was about 29,115,200 bushels, barley 69,440,000 bushels, wheat 27,280,000 bushels, and beans 17,360,000 bushels.

In view of the rapid modernization and industrialization of the country since the last seventy years, there is a gradual ten-

dency toward the concentration of the wealth of the country in the hands of the few, an inevitable tendency in all capitalistic countries. As a result of this tendency, the power of the middle class gradually becomes extinguished, and the "big business" element and the militarists are gradually coming together to manipulate the whole affairs of the country.

As a consequent of this "capitalistic-militarist combination" the burden of the people has also increased in proportion. The amount of tax each individual has to bear annually is approximately about 50 Yen, a burden heavier than that carried by any other people in the world.

Then following the increasing amount of taxation, additional military adventures here and there, increasing expenditures for armament, propaganda, and diplomatic intrigues, the price of commodities has gone up sky-high. A few illustrations may serve our point. The price of coal is about thirty percent higher than that in America, the price of sugar is about fifty percent higher, and the price of beef is about sixty-five percent higher.

In view of the increasing cost of living, the extraordinary amount of taxation, and

the increasing military expenses, the authorities are now concentrating their attention on three points as follows :

1. To improve the systems and technique of production ;
2. To check the increasing birth-rate;
3. To encourage the emigration of the surplus population to China and elsewhere.

For the time being, Japan's attention is mainly centered upon the emigration of her surplus population abroad. She is now intensively developing Formosa, Korea, and the Chinese province of Manchuria. Her latest objective is the Chinese Shantung Peninsula, which tempted her to create the Tsinan Incident. A glance of Japan's acquired rights and interests in different parts of China will convince us how hard Japan has been working to acquire them :

(a) Investment at Shanghai,			
Hankow, Tsingtao, cotton			
spinning industry	...	230,000,000	
Other industries	110,000,000	
Marine transportation	...	57,000,000	
Fixed properties	100,000,000	
(b) Ditto, elsewhere	25,000,000	

			522,000,000

(c) Investment in Manchuria,	
Transportation (railways,	
etc.)	330,000,000
Commercial undertakings	15,000,000
Manufacturing enterprises	74,000,000
Agricultural enterprises ...	19,000,000
Mining enterprises	8,000,000
Marine products enter-	
prises	15,000,000
Divers enterprises through	
banking facilities	626,000,000
Fixed properties	150,000,000
	<hr/>
	1,237,000,000

These figures reach a total of Yen 1,759,000,000. In addition to these the Japanese Government has made loans to the Peking Government and to the various provincial governments aggregating Yen 700,000,000.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

In order to accomplish what she desires, Japan has to adopt a particular foreign policy to deal with the various Powers concerning her activities in China and elsewhere. On the whole, her foreign policy is an extremely imperialistic one, to get whatever and wherever she can any special rights or privileges in the Continent of Asia at any and all costs.

The Chinese leaders do not understand Japan's policy, and have always worked in the dark in their dealings with Japan. The usual Chinese way of thinking is that they consider the policy of any government as individualistic, if certain individuals should leave their office, then their policy would also follow suit. That is why the Chinese leaders have always tried to line up with the opposition party in Japan to oppose the dominant party by imagining that if the dominant party should be defeated, then the new party's policy would naturally be changed, according to their expectation. But they have more than once been surprised by their wrongful inference,

•

and utterly disappointed over their expectation. However, there are still some leaders in China, who are adopting this mode of thinking and courting the favor of the opposition party in Japan with a hope to break down the dominant party and change their foreign policy.

There is a very clear indication that Japan is pursuing a policy of exclusion in China. In spite of her repeated declarations to the contrary, all her activities have tended to disprove these declarations. Judging from the rate of progress that she is now making in Manchuria and elsewhere, the "Open Door Policy" will soon become a relic, and the day of equal opportunities will be gone forever, and in their stead, a "Monroe Doctrine" of eastern Asia will be declared. This can be readily seen through Japan's terrific acts and attitudes toward China.

Since the presentation of the notorious twenty-one demands to China in 1915, Japan's attitude toward China has always been twofold, to threaten China with force and every other means on the one hand, and then softens down somewhat through the pretentious acts of the opposition party on the other, in order to hoodwink the

Chinese leaders that their policy of frightfulness is only that of a particular party. So whenever the policy of frightfulness has come to a deadlock, the opposition party would come out to request the dominant party to leave their office. When the opposition comes into power, their major policy of imperialistic aggression in China still continues, but in a somewhat milder form. When the Chinese leaders see this somewhat changed attitude, they generally think that after all Japan is not altogether too hard to deal with. That is why China has been beaten every time in her diplomatic transaction with Japan. There is no doubt that the Chinese leaders need more political education before they are Capable enough to cope with the experienced Japanese diplomats and statesmen. This is indeed very unfortunate on China's part to have such inefficient leaders to run her national affairs. When the Chinese leaders know Japan and her true attitudes, no doubt, they will be able to deal with the Japanese diplomats much more advantageously. Anyway, what the Chinese leaders need is more political education, in order to give them a clear insight into the true situation of international relations under modern conditions.

Since the adoption of a policy of continental expansion, Japan has created several wars to accomplish what she desires during the last three or more decades. The first war that she purposely created was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to annex the Chinese insular possessions of Formosa and the Liu Kiu Islands and to obtained a special privileged position in Korea.

Then came the Russo-Japanese War to further extend her rights in Korea and to establish certain claims in Manchuria. This Russo-Japanese war was really the starting point of her so-called special privileged position in Manchuria, and now she even extends her claims to Mongolia, and calls her continental policy,—the Manchurian and Mongolian Policy.

In the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, America, foreseeing the coming Japanese continental imperialism and the rapid extension of Japan's influence into the Pacific, offered her service as mediator between the belligerent powers through her president, Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, in order to curtail, to a certain extent, the rapid Japanese expansion both toward the continent and the Pacific.

In view of the American interference in her continental aggressive policy, Japan has somewhat modified the external form of her procedure and proclaimed her pretentious policy of Sino-Japanese cordiality for mutual help and mutual existence in order to deceive the Chinese leaders and the ignorant Chinese militarists thereby inducing them to concede to her secretly various privileges and rights in China to satisfy her aggressive aim.

On the other hand, Russo-Japanese relationship before and after the war of 1904-5 was based on an antagonistic position due to their rivalry for the domination of the extreme Far East. But since 1916, in the midst of the European War, where Russia was dangerously engaged in, Japan, in taking advantage of the situation, pretended to co-operate with her in the Far East to carve up China. Thus a secret treaty of mutual assistance concerning the domination of China was entered into between Russia and Japan in July, 1916. The two men who instigated this change of policy toward Russia was Konin Ohoky and Coin Kydo, who wrote a book to influence their government to do so. These

two men were also the instigators for the annexation of Korea by Japan.

Japan's present policy towards Russia is still based on the theory of Ohoky and Kydo. Thus, during the last year, Sinhei Goto was sent by Premier Tanaka to Soviet Russia for the renewal of the Russo-Japanese understanding toward China in order to refrain her from interfering with Japan's activities in China.

Although Japan has been pursuing an aggressive policy in continental Asia, she has been under the constant fear of interference from the outside; so she was quite careful in arranging things before she went into any enterprise of aggression. As a preliminary preparation for the presentation of her infamous twenty-one demands to China, she deceptively induced the American Secretary of State to acknowledge her special privileges in China through the so-called Lansing-Ishii understanding.

In the midst of the European War where most of the great Powers were busily engaged, Japan took advantage of the situation and forcibly occupied the German leasehold of Kiaochow and the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad in Shantung through

landing troops on Chinese territory to attack this region from the rear without any lawful justification. The recent landing of Japanese troops in Shantung is based on this unlawful act of the past.

The infamous twenty-one demands were also presented to China in the midst of the European War and after the Lansing-Ishii agreement had been entered into. Then at the Versailles Conference, Japan was able to deceive the Powers to acknowledge her unlawful claims in Shantung. But fortunately the Chinese delegates refused to sign the document granting away their own interests.

In view of this deadlock in the China affair, America then called a conference in Washington to settle this outstanding question. At this conference, Japan still insisted on her unlawful claims in Shantung, but China refused to recognize them, and at the mediation of the Powers Japan was compelled to return Tsingtao and the railroad to China, on condition that China was to pay her a ransom of more than \$70,000,000.

The traditional policy of the Powers toward China since 1899 was that of open

door and equal opportunity, and America was particularly the champion of this policy through her repeated declarations. America was wise enough to foresee the rapid development of Japan's militarism on this side of the Pacific, and if allowed to continue unchecked, would be a menace to the peace not of the Pacific alone, but to the whole world as well. So America was always watching Japan's activities in the Far East with keen interest.

In view of the great amount of economic interests possessed by Great Britain in China, her China Policy is more or less in accord with the American policy, to maintain a balance of power and the theory of open door and equal opportunity. The policy of the minor Powers toward China was about the same as that of Great Britain and America.

On the other hand, in view of her continental policy of aggression, and due to her geographical proximity, Japan has, for the last thirty years, tried to break down this open door and equality theory and convert China into an economic province in exclusion of all the other Powers. But in pursuance of this policy, she was always careful in order to avoid any

external conflicts with them. Thus, in the recent incident of sending troops to Shantung, she was shrewd enough to pre-arrange an incident and put all the blames on the Chinese, and the Chinese were so foolish as to fall into her trap: In spite of this purposive policy of Japan to exclude them from China, the Powers are being blindfolded by Japanese propaganda to believe in her good intentions. In order to successfully accomplish her major policy of continental aggression and economic exclusion, the following minor policies have been adopted by Japan toward the interested Powers:

1. Russia. Cordial understanding with Russia for the equal division of the economic advantages in Manchuria between the two countries. Japan is compelled to adopt this attitude, because she is under the constant fear of Russian interference from behind; but her attitude toward Russia is not sincere, she simply uses this slogan to hold Russia back in order that she may accomplish what she desires for her own benefit.

2. Germany. Cordial understanding with Germany in order to utilize her to disturb Great Britain, France, and Italy

from behind, so that these Powers will be too busily engaged with their own affairs, thus, shifting their attention from the Far East. In this way, Japan will have a free hand to accomplish what she desires in China.

3. Great Britain. Since the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan has always been on the look-out for British activities in China; consequently, she is utilizing Germany to intrigue behind England and at the same time pretends to show her an external cordiality, but if Great Britain should be in difficulties, Japan would keep aloof and watch for opportunities to harvest some gain thereby.

4. America. To misinform America whenever possible concerning the true situation in the Far East in order to hold back America's insistence on her traditional policy of open door and equal opportunity. At the same time she is trying to stir up anti-American feeling in Central and South America in order to shift the American attention from the Far East to Latin America. Then Japan is also utilizing Great Britain to watch America's actions concerning questions of the Far East through her promises to the British authorities.

5. China. Japan's latest attitude toward China is one of intriguing with the militarists in the country in order to prolong the civil war, so that the Powers would be involved in disgracing China, and then she might reap whatever benefits thereby. In the meantime she is also using her military power to accomplish what she desires when opportunity comes. The defeat of Kuo Sung-ling against Chang Tso-lin, the landing of troops in Shantung last year to interfere with the Northern Expedition, the declarations concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, the warning sent to Chang Tso-lin that in case of defeat he would be disarmed in order to scare him to withdraw back to Manchuria, the recent Tsinan Incident, the Murder of Chang Tso-lin and the warning given to the Manchurian authorities urging them not to co-operate with the Nationalist Government, are recent instances of Japan's intrigues and aggressions in China.

In view of Japan's aggressive policy in China and the Far East in general, it is interesting to see what would develop through her latest activities in both Shantung and Manchuria, and the attitude the Powers would take toward her movements.

CHAPTER V

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

When the European Powers were engaged in a great struggle in 1914, Japan took advantage of this situation and invaded the Chinese province of Shantung under the pretext of carrying out the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to compel Germany to cede the leasehold of Kiaochow and Tsingtao in Shantung to her. At first Germany refused to yield, but later circumstances compelled her to surrender. Following this, Japan not only occupied the leasehold of Kiaochow, but also the railroad leading from Kiaochow to Tsinan.

In this connection, it must be made clear that Japan captured the leasehold through invading Chinese territory, and declared one half of the Shantung Peninsula to be a war zone. Under these circumstances, China could say nothing, except making some futile protests and let Japan carry out her own wishes.

In 1915, a few months after the capture of Kiaochow when everything was quiet in Shantung, the Chinese Government then

requested Japan to abolish the war zone which she had established during the campaign against the German leasehold. To this request China met with a flat refusal, and in return, Japan declared that the Imperial Japanese Government had been insulted thereby.

Under the pretext of retaliation, on January 18, this last mentioned incident was made the occasion for the presentation of a series of demands, twenty-one in all, to the Chinese Government and compelled the latter to keep them secret. These demands were presented, contrary to diplomatic usage, to the president of the Chinese Republic, ignoring altogether the Chinese foreign office.

After these demands were presented and during the following three months when they were under discussion in Peking, Japan gradually increased her military pressure on China.

During the negotiations following the presentation of these demands, China had taken the stand that to grant them to Japan would be the complete surrender of her national independence. On the other hand, Japan's response to China's objections

was to further increase the military pressure on the latter.

Then on May 7, an ultimatum was presented to China to compel her to accept these demands without modification. When the last moment came, the demands were accepted with certain modifications at the mediation of certain powers. Below is printed a translation of these so-called twenty-one demands:

ARTICLE I

Designed to preserve peace in the Far East and to strengthen the friendly relations of the two countries.

A—China shall recognize the transfer of all the rights in Shantung acquired and enjoyed by Germany in accordance with treaty stipulations other rights with reference to China or regarding which Japan expects to come to an agreement with Germany eventually.

B—China shall not lease to other countries any territory or island on the coast of Shantung.

C—China shall grant to Japan the right to construct a railway from Yentai or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochau-Tsinan line.

D—China shall open without delay the principal important cities of Shantung to trade.

ARTICLE II

Designed to secure to Japan a position of special interest in south Manchuria and east Mongolia.

A—The lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, together with the south Manchurian railway and the Mukden-Antung railway, shall be extended to ninety-nine years.

B—Japanese subjects shall have the right to rent and purchase land in south Manchuria and east Mongolia for uses connected with manufacture and agriculture.

C—Japanese subjects shall have the right to go freely to south Manchuria and east Mongolia for purposes of residence and trade.

D—The right to open and operate mines in south Manchuria and east Mongolia shall be granted to Japanese subjects.

E—China shall obtain the consent of the Japanese Government to the actions of the two following kinds:

1. Permitting citizens or subjects of other countries to build railroads in south Manchuria or east Mongolia, or negotiating for loans.

2. Hypothecating the various revenues of south Manchuria and east Mongolia as security for foreign loans.

F—China shall consult Japan before employing advisers or instructors for conducting the administrative, financial, or military affairs of south Manchuria and east Mongolia.

G—Japan shall have control of the Kirin—Changchun railway for ninety-nine years.

ARTICLE III

A—China and Japan shall agree to act jointly, not independently, in the contemplated formation of the Han-Yeh-Ping company.

B—Without joint consent, foreigners shall not be permitted to open and operate mines in the neighborhood of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company's property, and anything affecting the company directly or indirectly shall be decided jointly.

ARTICLE IV

Designed to protect effectively the territorial integrity of China.

A—China shall not alienate or lease to other countries any port, harbor, or island on the coast of China.

ARTICLE V

A—The central government of China shall employ influential Japanese subjects as advisers for conducting administrative, financial, and military affairs.

B—Japanese hospitals, missions, and schools established in the interior shall have the right to hold land in China.

C—China and Japan shall jointly police the important places in China or employ a majority of Japanese in the police department.

D—China shall purchase from Japan at least half the arms and ammunition used in the whole country or establish jointly in Japan factories for the manufacture of arms.

E—China shall permit Japan to build railroads connecting Wuchang with Kiu-

kiang and Nanchang, Nanchang with Hangchow, and Nanchang with Chiaochau (Swatow).

F—In case the province of Fukien requires foreign capital for railway construction, mining, harbor improvements, and shipbuilding, Japan shall be first consulted.

G—Japan shall have the right to propagate religious doctrines in China.

By a perusal of the above demands, the readers will, no doubt, be convinced of the systematic program of Japan's aggression in China. The international developments in the Far East since the presentation of the twenty-one demands to China have been merely a repetition of the attempts of Japan to carry out her twenty-one demands. To reform a thief is an impossible thing.

CHAPTER VI

JAPAN'S POSITION IN MANCHURIA

Manchuria at present is one of the few frontier regions of the world that could support a rather large population. Some writers even say that Manchuria will be the future granary of China. A trip through this country will convince any observer that this statement is approximately correct. The present population of Manchuria is a little more than twenty million, yet more than two thirds of the fertile land of the region are still uncultivated. To be more definite, the greater section of Northern Manchuria is still virgin land covered with large forests. Through a large scale process of opening up the country, Manchuria can easily support a population of one hundred or more million inhabitants.

Since the last thirty or more years, Manchuria has become a source of Far Eastern international complications. In fact, a part of the Boxers' War as well as the Russo-Japanese War were fought right in the heart of Manchuria.

The cause of Manchuria's prominence in world politics is simply due to the fact that the country is rich in natural resources and virgin in conditon.

During the latter part of last spring the writer while travelling through Manchuria was astonished to see such a rich country, the greater part of which is still uncultivated. In general appearance, Manchuria to-day looks somewhat like the Middle West prairies of the United States of America fifty years ago. If early American frontier methods could be employed to open up this large country, the results would in some respects be even more promising than the American Middle West.

Chinese Immigration Into Manchuria

For years in the recent past, tens of thousands of Chinese coolies from the provinces of Shantung, Honan, and Chihli were entering Manchuria in all directions, some went by way of Shanhaikwan through the Chinese Great Wall and others went across the Gulf of Chihli from the Shantung peninsula.

These coolies usually went to Manchuria during the early part of the spring

to search for work, and returned during the fall after the harvest season was over. These emigrants from China usually reached Manchuria through tramping, occasionally some of them rode on third or fourth class trains, but the greater part of their journey was covered by foot. Some of them walked more than one thousand miles from Honan and Chihli to reach Northern Manchuria.

The number of immigrants entering Manchuria from Shantung and elsewhere during this year is unusually large, probably due to civil war and social disorder in the home districts of these immigrants which compel them to leave their native homes. Recent newspaper reports indicated that there were more than twelve thousand Chinese immigrants from Shantung reaching Dairen, the southern seaport of Manchuria, everyday. Conservatively estimated, there were more than one million Chinese immigrants entered Manchuria since the spring of this year.

During past years, the immigrants arriving Manchuria were practically all adult male laborers, but this year, conditions have somewhat changed. Among the immigrants there were women, children,

aged folks as well as young and middle aged individuals of both sexes. This is really a good sign for the colonization of Manchuria from the standpoint of China. The bringing along of families with these immigrants means that these folks will settle in Manchuria instead of returning to their native land after each harvest season. If the rate of Chinese immigration will continue in this fashion, in ten years' time, the population of Manchuria will, no doubt, reach the forty million mark.

Japanese Immigrant

Twenty years ago, Japan attempted to adopt a colonizing scheme for Manchuria by sending a great number of her subjects there every year, but she very soon found that this scheme was not workable. Although Japan's scheme was a purposive one, the Chinese unpurposive motivity was even more drastic and fruitful than Japan's intentional policy. The reason is obvious, the Chinese immigrants are entering Manchuria ten times faster than the Japanese. Now the Chinese population of Manchuria has already reached the twenty million mark yet the Japanese population remains about two hundred thousand or more.

The Japanese may succeed better than the Chinese collectively and co-operatively, but individually the Chinese everywhere are outwitting the Japanese. Furthermore, the Chinese coolies can live much cheaper than the Japanese, and thus can exist better in frontier regions than the Japanese can.

Japan's Changing Policy

In view of this condition, the Japanese have adopted a somewhat different method towards the encroachment of Manchuria. In recent years Japan has adopted a policy of exploitation and investment rather than by the infusion of a great Japanese population in to Manchuria, as Chinese labor could be employed much cheaper than Japanese labor. Furthermore, it is quite natural that Chinese natural resources could be developed with Chinese labor more easily.

A trip through the South Manchurian Railroad from Dairen northward will convince any observer concerning the activity of this new Japanese policy. The immense wharves, warehouses, transportation facilities, broad and extensive boulevards, banking and financial facilities, factories, mills, mines, importing and exporting facilities, publicity organs, municipal administration,

etc., are simply a few items of Japanese achievement in Manchuria. However, this is only the starting point of Japanese exploitation of the country, she would undoubtedly, be able to do immensely more in the future than what she had already achieved.

Russian Activities In Manchuria

On the other hand, Russia, or the Soviet Republic, is also still active in Northern Manchuria. The starting point of international competition in Manchuria was instigated by Russia. At the end of the nineteenth century, Russia, through her ambition to obtain an ice free port leading to the Pacific, built the gigantic railroad through the Siberian steppes and the heart of Manchuria, with its southern destination at the port of Dairen and Port Arthur, and its eastern destination at Vladivostok. When this gigantic project was accomplished, Russia attempted to consolidate her influence in the Far East, thus instigated the suspicion of the whole world, especially her eastern neighbor, the newly awakened Japan. In consequence, the Russo Japanese War was fought right in the heart of Manchuria.

As a result of the war, the Russian eastern ambition was partially paralysed through the cession of the southern section of this Russo-Manchurian railroad to Japan.

This Manchurian railroad was cut into two at Changchun, in central Manchuria, with the southern section given to Japan, and the northern half to be remained in Russian hands.

It was after obtaining this railroad that Japan began to carry out her ambition of exploitation systematically. Not only did Japan attempt to develop Southern Manchuria, she now also plans to outwit Russia in Northern Manchuria. The competition between the South Manchurian Railroad and the Chinese Eastern for the handling of the export trade of the whole country clearly indicates the ambition of Japan.

Russo-Japanese Competition

The outlet for export of Southern Manchuria is Dairen, and the outlet of Northern Manchuria is Vladivostok; consequently, Russia attempts to pull the export trade to her own port, and Japan, on the other hand, is trying to get all the trade to come to Dairen.

With these two factions in competition for trade and control of the region, Chinese interests are being jeopardized. Everywhere, following the lines of communication, both Russian and Japanese influences are encroaching upon the Chinese very rapidly.

It was rather fortunate that during and since the Russian revolution of 1917, a part of the Russian claims, privileges, and concessions has been taken back by China. But unfortunately, the Chinese in control of the region were not bold enough to go further and take back everything. If all the Russian interests in Northern Manchuria were taken back by China, much of the present and future complications would be avoided.

The Problem of Manchuria

The problem of Manchuria is really a significant one. At present China is rather too busy with her own affairs at home, consequently, whatever happens at her frontier is unattended to. If China were unified now, then the situation in Manchuria would probably be a little different.

There is no doubt that the future problem of Manchuria will be a threefold or triangular one, with Japan on the one

side, Russia on the other, and China on the third. The success of the one or the other will depend, to a great extent, upon the size of the population of each side and the resource at its command to meet whatever emergencies.

For the time being we may leave out the position of Russia and devote the rest of the discussion in this chapter to the position of China and Japan, and the policy China should adopt in the future.

Manchuria and China

The altitude of both Manchuria and Mongolia are much higher than China proper. These two regions have had great significant historical relations with China Proper in the past. Practically all the historical invasions into China by foreign races have come from the highlands of Mongolia and Manchuria. The main reason for the building of the Great Wall in Northern China was simply to keep off these invaders from the North. Since the last two thousand years, the Kins, the Mongols, the Manchus, etc., have been successive invaders of China. Some writers say that Mongolia and Manchuria are the roof of China, and others say that they are buffer

states. If China should lose these two regions, then China Proper would be in danger. In spite of the fact that these two regions are so important to the very existence of China, yet it is so pitiful that she is so busily engaged in suicidal warfare at home, without paying any attention to these frontier regions.

There is no doubt that China has neglected these frontier provinces before Japan could get so great a hold upon them. In this connection it would only be necessary to mention a few important rights and privileges exacted by Japan from China during the past two or three decades.

The Port of Dairen

We may begin with the seaport of Dairen. Before the construction of the South Manchurian Railroad, this prosperous seaport was simply a rocky and wasted piece of idle land. But now it becomes one of the important world trading seaports. There are boats sailing from Dairen to all parts of the world practically everyday. Then there are trains running northward from this port practically every two hours. The whole line of the South Manchurian Railroad is double tracked, and the traffic is

6969

comparatively heavy. During the past year, the gross receipts of this railroad were more than those of all the Chinese national railroads put together.

The port of Dairen and Port Arthur were originally a leasehold granted to Russia for a period of twenty-five years, beginning from the year 1899 and should have been ended in 1923. But after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan took over the rights of Russia. Then during the early days of the European War, when the Powers were busily engaged in defending themselves, Japan cleverly presented her notorious "Twenty-One Demands" to China and compelled her statesmen to accept them. Among these demands there was one relating to the extension of the leasehold of Dairen and Port Arthur from twenty-five years to ninety-nine years. In view of the helplessness of China at that time, the shortsighted Chinese statesmen accepted this provision and officially extended the terms of the leasehold to ninety-nine years.

The South Manchurian Railroad

The South Manchurian Railroad was also a war booty taken from Russia. With the Antung-Mukden extension, the whole

line now covers a distance of 695 miles. The main line of the road runs from Dairen northward through Mukden as far as Changchun to connect the Chinese Eastern Railroad for Siberia and other points west. According to the original Russo-Chinese agreement, it was stipulated that within a period of eighty years after the official opening up of the railroad for traffic, Russia was allowed to enjoy the road whatever she pleases, but after the eighty years are up, then the whole road would revert back to China unconditionally. The original agreement also provided that after the thirty-sixth year of its operation, China could redeem the whole road by the payment of a stipulated price. The South Manchurian Railroad was opened for traffic in 1903, if the original agreement would still be in force, then by the year 1939, China would be able to redeem the road by the payment of a stipulated redemption fund. But the "Twenty-One Demands" abolished this provision, and extended the period of reversion to ninety-nine years or to the year 2002 before China could get back the road unconditionally. This provision, of course, automatically cancels the provision concerning the redemption of the road in thirty-six years.

The Mukden Antung Line

This line covers a distance of 162 miles, which starts from Mukden and extends to Antung on the Korean frontier. During the Russo-Japanese War, Japan built a small narrow gauged railroad on this line for hauling war materials from the Korean frontier to the war spot near Dairen. The building of this road was not agreed to by China. Then in 1909, Japan, without the consent of China, destroyed the old road and built the present standard gauged line from Antung to Mukden. At that time the Chinese authorities were somewhat compelled by circumstances and Japanese influence to acquiesce to this Japanese demand, but with an understanding that after fifteen years from the date of the completion of the road, China could redeem it by the payment of an appraised price. But the "Twenty-One Demands" also compelled China to extend the period of reversion from fifteen to nintynine years.

The Kirin-Changchun Railroad was originally built with Chinese capital. It runs from the northern terminus of the South Manchurian Railroad to the capital city of the province of Kirin, in central Manchuria and covers a distance of 82 miles.

For quite a number of years Japan has tried very hard to obtain control of this road. Finally China agreed to accept one half of the Japanese capital, which amounts to \$2,130,000, to be repaid in twenty-five years. During the outstanding period of this debt, Japanese accountants and technical experts were to be employed by the road. Then in the "Twenty-one Demands", Japan tried to compelled China to allow her to control and manage this road for a period of ninty-nine years, but was strongly objected to by China, and so this demand was somewhat modified as follows: (1) Future loan agreements concerning this line will be based upon the practices of other railroads; (2) In case of future loans from foreign capitalists, the Kirin-Changchun line will be allowed to receive certain benefits.

Mining Rights

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan obtained two mining concessions at Fu-shun and Yen-tai as a part of her war booty. But China refused to recognize this right. However, after a series of negotiations for a period of four years China finally agreed to recognize this claim with a condition that when the ores are being mined the

Japanese would be obligated to pay to the Chinese Government a certain amount of revenue for their extraction as well as the payment of a certain amount of export duty for the same.

Aside from the above mentioned two mines, the Japanese are now also allowed to open other mines along the Antung-Mukden Line in co-operation with the agreement of 1907.

Since that time, through various negotiations, Japan was also allowed to have the exclusive privilege of operating nine other mines as follows:

1. The Niu-shin-tai Mines. This mine is located near the Pen-chi-hu; the annual output of ores is more than sixty thousand tons. The total amount of ores contained in this mine is estimated to be 25,000,000 tons.

2. The Tien-she-fu-kou Coal Mine. This mine is also located near the Niu-shin-tai Mine; the amount of coal contained therein is estimated to be 2,000,000 tons.

3. The Shan-sung-kang Coal Mine, located near the Chao-yang District, the annual production is about 1,000,000 tons,

and the amount of ore contained therein is about 15,000,00 tons.

4. The Tieh-chang Coal Mine, located on the east side of Tunghua District near the Hunho River. The amount of ore contained therein is unknown.

5. The Nuan-chi-tang Coal Mine, located at the west of Chinchow, the annual output of ore is about 30,000 tons.

6. The An-shan-chan Iron Mine, located at the An-shan-Station on the South Manchurian Line, which covers an area of several districts. The amount of ore contained therein is supposed to be more than 100,000,000 tons.

7. The Shan-sung-kang Iron Mine, located near the province of Kirin on the left bank of the Tumen River. The amount of ores contained therein is unknown.

8. The Kang-yao Coal Mine, located near the city of Kirin; its output is unknown.

9. The Chia-pi-kow Gold Mine, located near the City of Kirin, but the quality and quantity of the ores are not yet definitely known.

Leaseholds

All along the South Manchurian Railroad and around South Manchuria, Japan

holds more than twenty leaseholds of various kinds amounting to virtual possession of the land under their control. Then in the "Twenty-One Demands", more other privileges were extorted from China. Articles two to four of the 'Twenty-One Demands contained the following provisions;

1. Japanese subjects are allowed to lease land from the Chinese for the construction of factories and business houses throughout South Manchuria.

2. Japanese subjects are allowed to pursue their business and to move freely throughout South Manchuria without any molestation by either the Chinese Government or citizens.

3. Japanese subjects are allowed to operate agricultural enterprises in co-operation with the Chinese throughout Eastern Mongolia.

Adviserships

Advisers from foreign countries are usually overseers and detectives for their home government. So in order to establish her position securely throughout South Manchuria, Japan must compelled the Chinese government to employ as many Japanese subjects to be advisers as possible

in order to watch the Chinese government and also to get secret information for their home government. In the supplementary documents of the "Twenty-One Demands" Japan expressly mentioned that in case the Chinese government should employ foreign advisers relating to politics, finance, police, or military affairs, Japanese subjects should have preference. Although at the Washington Conference Japan agreed to abandon this demand, but at present, there are still quite a number of Japanese advisers in the Mukden Government.

Other Special Privileges

Besides these specific privileges that Japan has extorted from China either through negotiations or by force, she has also obtained other special privileges and concessions through similar methods. But since she wants to maintain her position securely in Manchuria, she must make all her privileges specific, otherwise competition of third parties will curtail her influence and rights. It must be understood here that Manchuria is a rich province, and that not only is Japan interested in it, but practically all the other powers such as the United States, England, France, Russia, and other countries as well. On the other

hand, China also knows this situation pretty well, so she has at several occasions granted other privileges to the other powers such as granting to England of a right of way for a railroad from Hsin-mintun to Fa-ku-men, such a road if once constructed will run paralld to the South Manchurian Railroad. Besides this, other rights were sometimes also granted to other parties than the Japanese.

In view of this, Japan also prepares to beat China wherever she can. Thus she expressly demanded from China the option that should China wish to construct any railroads in South Manchuria, she would have to do it with her own capital, and in case foreign capital were to be required, than Japan should be consulted. Then if China attempts to raise money through foreign loans by employing her land tax as security, Japan must also be consulted beforehand.

Since the conclusion of the recent European War and the organization of the Four Power Consortium, and the Washington Conference, although Japan expressly agrees to abandon her claim for preference in case of railroad and other loans, still she claims other rights throughout South Man-

churia, such as the construction of the branch lines of the South Manchurian Railroad and the operation of certain subsidiary industries such as mining and lumbering. She also claims to have the option to construct such roads as the following at her free will, viz., from Kirin to Hui-ning on the Korean frontier; from Chengchiatun to Taonan; from Kaiyuan, to Hailung and thence to Kirin then from Kirin to Changchun, a line to be in paralled with the present Changchun-Kirin Line; from Hsinminfu to Mukden, a line to run parallell to the existing road of the same name; and from Szepingchieh to Chengchiatun, etc. There is no doubt that Japan wants to maintain her position throughout Manchuria as securely as possible. Unless China wakes up and prepares to meet whatever emergencies that may arise, Manchuria will gradually pass over to the entire control of Japan, economically, politically, and diplomatically.

The international outlook of Manchuria is indeed not very optimistic, speaking from the standpoint of China. Japan is encroaching upon this rich province so quickly and surely, that unless China will prepare herself to meet Japan on the battlefield, there is very

little prospect that she will be able to regain her lost rights.

It may also be interesting to note in this connection that besides the special rights and privileges that Japan has already exacted from China, she is still employing other methods either openly or underhandedly to destroy whatever Chinese prestige there remains.

The Japanese Controlled Newspapers

The propaganda through Japanese controlled newspapers is one of the very clear instances of Japanese intrigue in Manchuria. At present there are several very widely circulated Japanese operated newspapers throughout Manchuria, the most notable ones are the Mukden Times, the South Manchurian Daily, the Manchurian Daily. These papers spread propaganda of all sorts to destroy Chinese prestige and to build up further Japanese influence throughout Manchuria. These papers encourage Chang Tso-lin to devote his energy to make war against his compatriots inside of the Great Wall in order that his power may be crushed and that Japanese influence be established more firmly. These papers have very large circulation throughout the whole

area of Manchuria, and are much better equipped and better financed than the Chinese dailies. In this way they can create all kinds of rumors relating to politics, finance, and international questions.

Japanese Financial Intrigues

Throughout Manchuria, and South Manchuria in particular, the Japanese are operating various kinds of financial institutions, a great part of their business is being done in speculations in the fengpiao, or Mukden paper currency. As a result of their speculation, together with their propaganda concerning the local political and financial conditions, the value of the fengpiao has gradually depreciated from its face value to its present worth of about two cents on the dollar. Every time there is a rumor of war inside of the Great Wall, or some movements on the part of some militarists, the value of the fengpiao may either rise or fall in accordance with the situation. When Chang Tso-lin met certain reverses in his campaigns as in the recent campaign around Peking, the value of the fengpiao dropped heavily, but when rumor of peace came, then its value would immediately soar up again.

Chang Tso-lin and the Fengpiao

In view of the fact that the fengpiao are gradually becoming worthless papers, the Mukden authorities are resorting to trading in order to finance their campaigns inside of the Great Wall. Thus, they buy beans and other Manchurian agricultural products from the interior and ship them to Dairen and other South Manchurian ports to exchange for silver or Japanese yen in order to buy drafts on Shanghai or other places.

Japanese Textbooks & Publications

In those regions under actual Japanese control, the textbooks used in the schools are all written in the Japanese language, which treats China as a foreign country with an attempt to Japanize the Chinese population whenever they can.

The Japanese are indeed an ambitious race, besides the textbooks and newspapers that they are publishing to Japanize the Chinese population in South Manchuria, they are diligently studying the social, political, economic, and military conditions of Manchuria and Mongolia. They are now having more than one hundred and fifty different kinds of books, periodicals and

other publications concerning these two regions. They are actually treating these regions as their colonies.

The Tanaka Cabinet and Manchuria

The latest manifestation of Japanese ambition in both Manchuria and Mongolia was the calling of an Eastern Conference by the Tanaka Cabinet last year, and the adoption of a so-called "positive policy" towards Manchuria. The following topics were discussed at the conference :

1. The ways and means for the development of the economic resources of Manchuria and Mongolia.
2. The ways and means for the prevention of the growing Soviet influence in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.
3. The policy to be adopted in case any railway built in contrary to Japanese treaty rights.
4. The policy concerning the linking up of the existing railroads.
5. The policy concerning the railroad from Taonan to Tsitishar, which is not yet completed due to Soviet opposition.
6. The policy concerning the proposed railroad from Kirin to Huining, on the Korean frontier.

7. The policy concerning the Chinese agitation for the abolition of extraterritoriality.
8. The policy concerning the leasehold of lands by Japanese subjects for agricultural and industrial purposes.
9. The major policy concerning both Manchuria and Mongolia.

Japan's latest activities in Manchuria may be shown by the following declaration issued by Premier Tanaka to warn the Chinese authorities.

Japan's Declaration Concerning Manchuria

The portion of the declaration which the Japanese authorities made public, is as follows:

“The life of the population in China is characterized by extreme unrest and distress owing to the constant disturbances which have now extended over many years; and in consequence of which foreign residents enjoy no assurance of safety in the pursuit of their occupations. It is, accordingly, the earnest desire of Chinese and foreigners alike that the disturbances should terminate, as soon as possible, in such a manner as may

lead to the emergency of an united and peaceful China.

“Especially is this keenly hoped for by Japan, whose interests are specially and deeply involved, on account of her being China's nearest neighbor.

“The disturbances, however, now threaten to spread to the Peking and Tientsin districts, and it is feared that Manchuria may also be affected.

“The Japanese Government attach the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and are prepared to do all they can in order to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute a probable cause of such disturbance.

“Under these circumstances, should the disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, the Japanese Government, on their part, may possibly be constrained to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria.

“It must be noted, however, that the policy of the Japanese Government, which consists in maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality towards the contending forces, remains unchanged in every respect, and that, should the course of events be such as to render the above mentioned measure imperative, the Japanese Government will, in respect of the time and method of its adoption, exercise due care to provide against any unfair consequences arising to either of the two opposed parties.”

The Political Power of the South Manchurian Railroad

Recently the Tanaka Cabinet also appointed the president of the South Manchurian Railroad to act as administrative head of the Japanese occupation area in South Manchuria. He is now empowered to levy taxes, to control the Japanese police system, and to conduct the diplomatic affairs of the Area. It is quite clear that the South Manchurian Railroad Company will, from now on, be operated on a somewhat similar basis as that of the British East India Company, which was also granted political powers by its home government.

Proposed Remedies

1. Publicity

In view of the fact that the Chinese population of Manchuria is growing rapidly, and that Japan is trying to denationalize Chinese thought and stir up dissension among the Chinese through their publicity organs and educational institutions, it seems that the most important thing for the Chinese to do would be the organization of efficient propaganda bureaux, well-managed publicity organs, and extensive popular educational institutions throughout the whole territory in order to upset this Japanese influence.

2. Financial Reforms

Due to the depreciation of the value of the fengpiao, Chang Tso-lin shot to death a few of the Chinese money dealers in Mukden last year. This kind of policy is rather short-sighted, as the source of the trouble does not lie in these money dealers, but in the Japanese speculators and their propaganda organs. These speculators, of course, take a very active part in the breaking down of the Mukden financial system, but after all it is the defectiveness of the system itself that invites destruction. The

fengpiao has been an unredeemable paper for a very long time, except that the Government still accepts it for the payment of taxes and other public obligations. It seems that the best way to cure this evil would be the redemption of these paper notes at their current value and then to issue new notes with large reserves to insure their future redemption and the resumption of specific payment for public debts and other obligations. Of course, this would be a very hard task to carry out this scheme, as it needs a great amount of silver to do so, especially when Mukden has just gone through a destructive war inside of the Great Wall.

3. Railroad Construction

The center of Japanese influence in Manchuria is, of course, the South Manchurian Railroad, whose capital amounts to over 440,000,000 yen. The number of employees in the whole line amounts to more than 40,000 persons. Aside from the losses due to the operation of subsidiary business institutions such as hotels and iron works, the annual net profit of the road still amounts to about 50,000,000 Yen. The South Manchurian Railroad is one of the most profitable roads in the world, its revenue for the past year was more than

those of all the Chinese government railroads combined as stated above. Of course, the civil war in China must be taken into consideration in accounting for the decrease in the revenue of the Chinese government railroads. Anyway, Manchuria is a rich province; that is the secret of the enormous profits of the South Manchurian Line. The largest part of the traffic of the Line is the transportation of Manchurian beans to Dairen for export.

Now if China were to compete with Japan successfully in Manchuria, she should also construct railroads to absorb a part of the traffic of the South Manchurian Line. The line from Taonan to Tsitsihar must be completed in order to bring the North Manchurian products southward through a Chinese operated line instead of the Chinese Eastern, which is a Chinese and foreign joint enterprise. Then the line from Liaoyuen to Hsiminfu (this line has already been completed since this Chapter was written) must also be constructed to connect the Taonan line with the Peking-Mukden line in order to rush the Manchurian products to either Hulutao or Chinwangtao for export, instead of allowing them to proceed to Dairen. It seems that the most important

thing for China to do to meet Japanese competition would be the linking up of the Taonan line with the Peking-Mukden Line. When this scheme can be pushed through, then the traffic of the South Manchurian Line will likely be reduced to one half. Aside from this main trunk line, then branches and local extensions must also be constructed to meet local necessities.

4. Harbor Construction

The future great Chinese ports for the export of Manchurian products will undoubtedly be Hulutao and Chinwangtao. In 1887 when Hsu Shih-chang was Governor of Manchuria, he employed certain British technical experts to survey a certain coastal place called Hulutao on the Peking-Mukden Line not very far from Chinchow with a view to build a sea port there. In 1910 the construction of the harbor actually began, but the revolution of 1911 suspended the work, then in 1924 during the Tsao Kun regime, work was to be resumed again, but with the fall of the Tsao Kun administration, construction was stopped once more. If this port can be built up, then, no doubt, Dairen will meet certain reverses. A certain amount of the Manchurian products can also be transported to Chinwangtao for

export. This port lies only a short distance south of Hulutao, also located on the Peking-Mukden Line.

5. Limitation Of Leaseholds

Japan has continuously pressed on China to obtain permission for her subjects to hold land in Manchuria under certain conditions, mostly in the form of leaseholds. This matter should be limited as much as possible, and if the term of the lease is up, then, unless a new lease be contracted, the right to such land and its premises must at once be reverted back to China. In this way, all Japanese expectant permanent claims would be abolished.

6. Mukden's Obligation

The most important thing for the Manchurian authorities to do is to devote their whole energy to build up Manchuria. They should carry out the above mentioned schemes by building railroads and highways, by clearing off the forests, by opening up the mines, reclaiming the waste and uncultivated lands, building up the modernized industries, improving the finance, and the weights and measures as well as the educational system together with the building up of a strong and efficient army for the

defence of the Northeastern frontier. For carrying on the work, they should recruit the emigrants from Shantung, Chihli, and Honan to help them. Then as to the administrators they can also recruit them from the inside of the Great Wall. If they can do that, they will surely become the greatest factor in Chinese national politics as well as in world affairs. However, if they wish to continue their activities inside of the Great Wall, and refuse to devote their energy to the building up of Manchuria, they will sooner or later be defeated again, as all other militarists have been, and fall into oblivion. It is now for them to decide as to which course they shall take.

CHAPTER VII

JAPAN IN SHANTUNG

When the European War started in 1914, China proposed that the Far East should be neutralized, and later America joined China in bringing this matter to the attention of both Germany and the Allied Powers. In the meantime, Germany accepted this proposal and requested that England should agree to the same. However, before there had been any further correspondence with either Japan or England, Japan handed an ultimatum to Germany, the gist of which is as follows:

1. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

In this note handed to the German authorities, Japan gave Germany only eight

days to give unconditional acceptance. To this request, Germany did not comply, so Japan proceeded to capture the port of Kiaochow.

As Japan was proceeding to capture Kiaochow, she requested the Chinese Government to be absolutely passive. But as soon as Kiaochow was captured, the Chinese authorities unofficially requested the United States to propose that the German leasehold should be transferred to the United States for immediate retransfer back to China. To this proposal, Japan and England objected.

This difference of opinion between the United States and Japan, which caused somewhat strained relations between these two countries for the next eight years, has finally led to the American protests against Japan's occupation of Shantung at both the Versailles and Washington Conferences.

After the capture of Kiaochow, Japan not only did not agree to retransfer the port of Kiaochow and all the German rights and privileges in Shantung back to China, but instead, she presented her notorious twenty-one demands to China for acceptance, as described in Chapter Five.

After the presentation of the notorious twenty-one demands to China, Japan determined to stay in Shantung forever. At the Versailles Conference, she attempted to speak for China, and induced the other Powers to recognize her illegal claim to the Chinese province of Shantung by having the same stipulated in the treaty of peace. But China refused to sign such a document granting away a part of its territory to an aggressive neighbor.

Japan continued to occupy Shantung in spite of China's refusal to sign the document formally granting the same to her. In view of this deadlock in the situation, America invited eight other Powers to Washington to settle certain problems concerning the Pacific, and particularly those concerning Shantung and China in 1921.

At this Conference, a treaty was arranged by the nine Powers and signed by America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Among the provisions of this treaty are the following:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

1—To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China ;

2—To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government ;

3—To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China ;

4—To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

The second article of this treaty prohibits any of the Powers signatory to the agreement from entering into any arrangement with any other Power, "individually or collectively" which would infringe or impair the principles stated in the first article. This article fundamentally prevents Japan from entering into any secret treaty with any of the other Powers, covering the present Japanese activities in Shantung and North China. Article III of the Treaty als_o

has a bearing on the present Japanese activities in China and reads in part as follows:

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China:

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

Article IV of the Treaty also has a bearing on the present situation as may be seen by a perusal of its text as follows:

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

The next two articles pertain to equality of treatment in the shipment of goods over the Chinese railways and to the respecting of China's rights as a neutral in the event of a war in the Far East to which China is not a party. The next, or Article VII, also has a bearing on the present situation, the clause reads as follows :

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

The above treaty was signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. From reading the text of this Chapter, the readers can readily see that Japan's intentions from

the very beginning were selfish and aggressive. From the time Japan captured the German privileges and rights in Shantung to the time of her transfer of the same back to China, she has held them for a period of almost eight full years.

Even at the Washington Conference, Japan had no intention to return these former German privileges in Shantung to China, she was only compelled to do so at the almost compulsory mediation of the Powers. However, after the transfer of the Shantung Peninsula back to Chinese control, Japan has always felt regretful about it, and since then she was always trying to find an opportunity to recapture this prosperous Shantung Peninsula back. However, their long expectation had finally come when the Nationalist Northern Expedition was launched.

When the Northern Expedition was approaching Shantung last year, Japan had already sent an army of invasion there to wait for the Nationalists, as described elsewhere in this book. After the split in the Nationalist Government, the Northern Expedition was abandoned, and so Japan withdrew her forces also. When the Nationalists started their Northern Expedi-

tion again this year, the Japanese troops were sent there again to wait for them to create an incident. So the Tsinan Incident has been long anticipated by the Chinese publicists.

Below is printed the full text of the treaty made at Washington between Japan and China at the mediation of the Powers concerning the retrocession of Kiaochow and the former German privileges in Shantung to Chinese administration. The magnitude of the problem and the extent of the privileges involved are quite significant.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty restoring Shantung to China

Japan and China, being equally animated by a sincere desire to settle amicably, and in accordance with their common interest, the outstanding questions relative to Shantung, have resolved to conclude a treaty for the settlement of such questions, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan ;

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of the Navy ;

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ; and

Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

His Excellency the President of the Chinese Republic; Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary ;

Vikyuin Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary ; and

Chung-Hui Wang, Former Minister of Justice ;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles :

SECTION I

Restoration of the Former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow

ARTICLE I

Japan shall restore to China the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow

ARTICLE II

The government of Japan and the government of the Chinese Republic shall each appoint three Commissioners to form a Joint Commission, with powers to make

and carry out detailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the administration of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow and to the transfer of public properties in the said Territory and to settle other matters likewise requiring adjustment.

For such purposes, the Joint Commission shall meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The transfer of the administration of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow and the transfer of public properties in the said Territory as well as the adjustment of other matters under the preceding Article, shall be completed as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

The government of Japan undertakes to hand over to the government of the Chinese Republic, upon the transfer to China of the administration of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow, such archives, registers, plans, title deeds and other documents in the possession of Japan, or certified copies thereof, as may be necessary for the transfer of the administration, as well as

those that may be useful for the subsequent administration by China of the said Territory and of the Fifty Kilometre Zone around Kiaochow Bay.

SECTION II

Transfer of Public Properties

ARTICLE V

The government of Japan undertakes to transfer to the government of the Chinese Republic all public properties including land, buildings, working or establishments in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow, whether formerly possessed by the German authorities, or purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities during the period of the Japanese administration of the said Territory, except those indicated in Article VII. of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VI

In the transfer of public properties under the preceding Article, no compensation will be claimed from the government of the Chinese Republic; Provided, however, that for those purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities, and also for the improvements on or additions, to those formerly possessed by the German authorities,

the government of the Chinese Republic shall refund a fair and equitable proportion of the expenses actually incurred by the government of Japan, having regard to the principle of depreciation and continuing value.

ARTICLE VII

Such public properties in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow are required for the Japanese Consulate to be established in Tsingtao shall be retained by the government of Japan, and those required more especially for the benefit of the Japanese community, including public schools, shrines and cemeteries, shall be left in the hands of the said community.

ARTICLE VIII

Details of the matters referred to in the preceding three Articles shall be arranged by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II of the present Treaty.

SECTION III

Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

ARTICLE IX

The Japanese troops, including gendarmes, now stationed along the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, shall be withdrawn as soon as the Chinese police or

military force shall have been sent to take over the protection of the Railway.

ARTICLE X

The disposition of the Chinese police or military force and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops under the preceding Article may be effected in sections.

The date of the completion of such process for each section shall be arranged in advance between the competent authorities of Japan and China.

The entire withdrawal of such Japanese troops shall be effected within three months if possible, and, in any case, not later than six months, from the date of the signature of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The Japanese garrison at Tsingtao shall be completely withdrawn simultaneously, if possible, with the transfer to China of the administration of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow, and, in any case not later than thirty days from the date of such transfer.

SECTION IV

Maritime Customs at Tsingtao.

ARTICLE XII

The Custom House of Tsingtao shall be made an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs upon the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XIII

The Provisional Agreement of August 6, 1915, between Japan and China, relating to the reopening of the Office of the Chinese Maritime Customs at Tsingtao shall cease to be effective upon the coming into force of the present Treaty.

SECTION V

Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway

ARTICLE XIV

Japan shall transfer to China the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, together with all other properties appurtenant thereto, including wharves, and other similar properties.

ARTICLE XV

China undertakes to reimburse to Japan the actual value of all the Railway properties mentioned in the preceding Article.

The actual value to be so reimbursed shall consist of the sum of fifty-three million, four hundred and six thousand, one hundred and forty-one (53,406,141) gold marks (which is the assessed value of such portion of the said properties as was left behind by Germany), or its equivalent, plus the amount which Japan, during her administration of the Railway, has actually, expended for permanent improvements on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance for depreciation.

It is understood that no charge will be made with respect to the wharves, warehouses and other similar properties mentioned in the preceding Article, except for such permanent improvements on or additions to them as may have been made by Japan, during her administration of the Railway, less a suitable allowance for depreciation.

ARTICLE XVI

The government of Japan and the government of the Chinese Republic shall each appoint three Commissioners to form a Joint Railway Commission, with powers to appraise the actual value of the Railway properties on the basis defined in the preced-

ing Article, and to arrange the transfer of the said propeties.

ARTICLE XVII

The transfer of all the Railway properties under Article XIV. of the present Treaty shall be completed as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than nine months from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XVIII

To effect the reimbursement under Article XV. of the present Treaty, China shall deliver to Japan simultaneously with the completion of the transfer of the Railways properties, Chinese Government Treasury Notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the Railway, and running for a period of fifteen years, but redeemable, whether in whole or in part at the option of China, at the end of five years from the date of the delivery of the said Treasury Notes, or at any time there after upon six months' previous notice.

ARTICLE XIX

Pending the redemption of the said Treasury Notes under the preceding Article, the government of the Chinese Republic will select and appoint, for so long a period as

any part of the said Treasury Notes shall remain unredeemed, a Japanese subject to be Traffic Manager, and another Japanese subject to be Chief Accountant jointly with the Chinese Chief Accountant and with co-ordinate functions.

These officials shall all be under the direction, control and supervision of the Chinese managing director, and removable for cause.

ARTICLE XX

Financial details of a technical character relating to the said Treasury Notes, not provided for in this Section, shall be determined in common accord between the Japanese and Chinese authorities as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

SECTION VI

Extensions of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway

ARTICLE XXI

The concessions relating to the two extensions of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, namely, the Tsinanfu-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchowfu lines, shall be made

open to the common activity of an international financial group, on terms to be arranged between the government of the Chinese Republic and the said group.

SECTION VII

Mines

ARTICLE XXII

The mines of Tsechwan, Fangtze, and Chinlingchen for which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to Germany, shall be handed over to a company to be formed under a special charter of the government of the Chinese Republic, in which the amount of Japanese capital shall not exceed that of Chinese capital.

The mode and terms of such arrangement shall be determined by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II. of the present Treaty.

SECTION VIII

Opening of the Former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow

ARTICLE XXIII

The government of Japan declares that it will not seek the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement, or of an international settlement, in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow.

The government of the Chinese Republic, on its part, declares that the entire area of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow will be opened to foreign trade, and that foreign nationals will be permitted freely to reside and carry on commerce, industry and other lawful pursuits within such area.

ARTICLE XXIV

The government of the Chinese Republic further declares that vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow, whether under the German regime or during the period of the Japanese administration, will be respected.

All questions relating to the status or validity of such vested rights acquired by Japanese subjects or Japanese companies shall be adjusted by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II of the present Treaty.

SECTION IX

Salt Industry

ARTICLE XXV

Whereas the salt industry is a government monopoly in China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese subjects or Japanese

companies actually engaged in the said industry along the coast of Kiaochow Bay shall be purchased by the government of the Chinese Republic for a fair compensation, and that the exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt produced by such industry along the said coast is to be permitted on reasonable terms.

Arrangements for the above purposes, including the transfer of the said interests to the government of the Chinese Republic, shall be made by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II of the present Treaty. They shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

SECTION X

Submarine Cables

ARTICLE XXVI

The government of Japan declares that all the rights, titles and privileges concerning the former German submarine cables between Tsingtao and Chefoo and between Tsingtao and Shanghai are vested in China, with the exception of those portions of the said two cables which have been utilized by the government of Japan for the laying of a cable between Tsingtao and Sasebo; it being

understood that the question relating to the landing and operation at Tsingtao of the said Tsingtao-Sasebo cable shall be adjusted by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, subject to the terms of the existing contracts to which China is a party.

SECTION XI

Wireless Stations

ARTICLE XXVII

The government of Japan undertakes to transfer to the government of the Chinese Republic the Japanese wireless stations at Tsingtao and Tsinanfu, for a fair compensation for the value of these stations, upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops at the said two places, respectively.

Details of such transfer and compensation shall be arranged by the Joint Commission provided for in Article II of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XXVIII

The present Treaty (including the Annex thereto) shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking as soon as possible, and not later than four months from the date of its signature.

It shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in duplicate, in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Washington this fourth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE (L. S.)

V.K. WELLINGTON KOO (L. S.)

CHUNG-HUI WANG (L. S.)

T. KATO (L. S.)

K. SHIDEHARA (L. S.)

M. HANIHARA (L. S.)

ANNEX

I

Renunciation of Preferential Rights

The government of Japan declares that it renounces all preferential rights with respect to foreign assistance in persons, capital and material stipulated in the Treaty of March 6, 1898, between China and Germany.

II

Transfer of Public Properties

It is understood that public properties to be transferred to the government of the

Chinese Republic under Article V of the present Treaty include (1) all public works such as roads, water works, parks, drainage and sanitary equipment, and (2) all public enterprises such as those relating to telephone, electric light, stockyard and laundry.

The government of the Chinese Republic declares that in the management and maintenance of public works to be so transferred to the government of the Chinese Republic, the foreign community in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow shall have fair representation.

The government of the Chinese Republic further declares that, upon taking over the telephone enterprise in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow, it will give due consideration to the requests from the foreign community in the said Territory for such extensions and improvements in the telephone enterprise as may be reasonably required by the general interests of the public.

With respect to public enterprises relating to electric light, stockyard and laundry, the government of the Chinese Republic, upon taking them over, shall re-transfer them to the Chinese municipal authorities of Tsingtao, which shall, in

turn, cause commercial companies to be formed under Chinese laws for the management and working of the said enterprises, subject to municipal regulation and supervision.

III

Maritime Customs at Tsingtao

The government of the Chinese Republic declares that it will instruct the Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs (1) to permit Japanese traders in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow to communicate in the Japanese language with the Customs House of Tsingtao; and (2) to give consideration, within the limits of the established service regulations of the Chinese Maritime Customs, to the diverse needs of the trade of Tsingtao, in the selection of a suitable staff for the said Custom House.

IV

Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway

Should the Joint Railway Commission provided for in Article XVI of the present Treaty fail to reach an agreement on any matter within its competence, the point or points at issue shall be taken up by the government of Japan and the government of the Chinese Republic for discussion and adjustment by means of diplomacy.

In the determination of such point or points, the government of Japan and the government of the Chinese Republic shall, if necessary, obtain recommendations of experts of a third Power or Powers who shall be designated in common accord between the two governments.

V

Chefoo-Weihsien Railway

The government of Japan will not claim that the option for financing the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway should be made open of the common activity of the International Financial Consortium, provided that the said Railway is to be constructed with Chinese capital.

VI

**Opening of the Former German
Leased Territory of Kiaochow**

The government of the Chinese Republic declares that pending the enactment and general application of laws regulating the system of local self-government in China, the Chinese local authorities will ascertain the views of the foreign residents in the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow in such municipal matters as may directly affect their welfare and interests.

T. KATO	SAO-KE ALFRED SZE
K. SHIDEHARA	V. K. WELLINGTON KOO
M. HANIHARA	CHUNG-HUI WANG

**Agreed Terms of Understanding
Recorded in the Minutes of the
Japanese and Chinese delegations
Concerning the Conclusion of the
Treaty for the Settlement of Out-
standing Questions relative to Shan-
tung.**

I Transfer of Public Properties

1. Japanese subjects will be permitted, subject to the provisions of Chinese law, to become members or shareholders of the commercial companies to be formed with respect to public enterprises mentioned in Paragraph 4 of Annex II of the Treaty.

II Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

2. After the withdrawal of the Japanese troops provided for in Articles IX-XI of the Treaty, no Japanese military force of any kind will remain in any part of Shantung.

III Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway

3. All light railways constructed by Japan in Shantung and all properties appurtenant thereto shall be considered as part of the properties of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway.

4. The telegraph lines along the Railway shall also be considered as part of the Railways properties.

5. The Chinese authorities, upon taking over the Railway, shall have full power and discretion to retain or to remove the present employees of Japanese nationality in the service of the Railway. In replacing such employees, reasonable notice shall be given before the date of the transfer of the Railway. Detailed arrangements regarding the replacements to take effect immediately on the transfer of the Railway are to be made by the Joint Railway Commission provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty.

6. The entire subordinate staff of the Japanese traffic manager and the Japanese Chief Accountant of the Railway is to be appointed by the Chinese managing director. After two years and a half from the date of the transfer of the Railway, the Chinese government may appoint an assistant traffic manager of Chinese nationality for the period of two years and a half, and such Chinese assistant traffic manager may likewise be appointed at any time upon notice being given for the redemption of the Treasury Notes under Article XVII of the Treaty.

7. The Chinese government is under no obligation to appoint Japanese subjects as members of the subordinate staff above mentioned.

8. The redemption of the Treasury Notes under Article XVIII of the Treaty will not be effected with funds raised from any source other than Chinese.

9. The Chinese government will ask the Japanese government for such information as may be useful to making the selection of the Japanese traffic manager and the Japanese Chief Accountant of the Railway.

10. All questions relating to the existing contracts or commitments made by the Japanese authorities in charge of the railway shall be settled by the Joint Railway Commission; and, prior to the transfer of the Railway, the said Japanese authorities will not make any new contracts or commitments calculated to be harmful to the interests of the Railway.

IV Opening of the Former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow

11. The term "lawful pursuits" used in Article XXIII of the Treaty shall not be so construed as to include agriculture, or any enterprise prohibited by Chinese law or

not permitted to foreign nationals under the treaties between China and foreign Powers, it being understood that this definition shall be without prejudice to the question of the salt industry provided for in Article XXV of the Treaty or to any question relating to vested rights which shall be determined in accordance with Article XXIV of the Treaty.

V Post Offices

12. All the Japanese Post Offices outside of the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochoo shall be withdrawn simultaneously with the transfer of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, if such transfer shall take place before January 1, 1922 and in any case, not later than the said date.

13. All the Japanese Post Offices within the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochoo shall be withdrawn simultaneously with the transfer of the administration of the said Territory.

VI Claims

14. The omission of any reference in the Treaty to the question of claims which Chinese citizens may have against the Japanese authorities or Japanese subjects, for the restitution of real property of Chinese

citizens in Shantung, shall not prejudice such claims.

15. The Chinese authorities shall furnish the Japanese authorities with a list of such claims. Justice shall be done through diplomatic channels as regards the claims against the Japanese authorities, and through ordinary judicial procedure as regards the claims against Japanese subjects. With respect to the latter class of claims, the investigation into actual facts of each case may, if necessary, be conducted by a Joint Commission of Japanese and Chinese officials, in equal number, to be specially designated for that purpose.

16. The Japanese government shall not be held responsible for any damages which may have been directly caused by military operations of Japan during the late war.

CHAPTER VIII

PRELUDE TO THE TSINAN INCIDENT

There is clear evidence that Japan has been very active in looking for opportunities to gain special rights and privileges in China. A brief survey of a few of her recent activities in China since the past year will reveal to us the fact that the Tsinan Incident is a premeditated affair.

A year ago about this time there was a conference at Dairen called by the Japanese Government to discuss certain demands to be presented to China. The Chinese press reported the following points as the topics of discussion :

1. To demand the right of permanent ownership of land for Japanese subjects in Manchuria. In exchange for this right, Japan expresses her willingness to abolish her right of extraterritoriality in Manchuria, and in case of refusal by the Chinese authorities, then she will demand that the present system of leaseholds be equal to the same status of permanent ownership.

2. To press on the Chinese Government to restrict the Peking-Mukden Railroad from extending its lines any further north than its present destination at Mukden. This second point also includes a demand on the Chinese Government to agree not to build any railroad through central Manchuria in parallel with the South Manchurian Railroad.

3. To establish certain large steel and iron plants in Manchuria in order to produce the necessary products for all the Manchurian railroads and factories.

4. The enforcement of the notorious "Twenty-One Demands," with Manchuria as the starting basis, and at the same time to appoint the following officers for the various places throughout China as a preparation for the enforcement of the "Twenty-One Demands," (a) a commercial officer, a secretary, and a managerial officer for Mukden; (b) a shipping officer, whose duty is to look after the Japanese shipping interests at Tientsin and Tsingtao; (c) a shipping officer and a superintendent of factories at Shanghai; (d) an officer of industries at Hankow and Tsinan; (e) an additional commercial consul at Hongkong; (f) an inspector of weights and measures.

Chinese press reports also stated that simultaneous with the Dairen Conference last year there were official negotiations in Moscow with the Soviet authorities concerning the joint division of interests between Japan and Russia in both Manchuria and Mongolia. The report stated that the following points were agreed upon:

1. A uniform tariff rate among the South Manchurian, the Chinese Eastern, and the Ussuri Railroads.

2. The extension of the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railroad.

3. Mode of Soviet-Japanese economic co-operation in North Manchuria.

4. Japan's recognition of the Sovietization of Outer Mongolia.

Besides the above mentioned activities, a year ago Japan has also sent troops to Shantung to block the northern advance of the Nationalists, an act very much similar to that of landing troops at Tsingtao to create the recent Tsinan Incident. The Tsinan Incident would have occurred last year if the Nationalists had determined to press on with their campaign toward Tsinan. The Nationalist postponement of the North-

ern campaign last year only delayed the occurrence of the Tsinan Incident to a few months later.

Last year when the Nationalist northern expedition was stopped, the Japanese troops also withdrawn; but this year, when the northern campaign was started again, the Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan once more.

Besides the sending of troops to Shantung to create a major situation in order to gain larger advantages, her agents are ever eager to create minor incidents in order to get other benefits. The following list of Japanese activities during the last few months in different parts of China clearly indicates this point.

February 27, three Japanese battle-ships fired upon a Chinese crowd at Pingtan, ruthlessly killed more than 30 persons, and injured more than 100 others.

February 28, the Japanese steamer *Atsuta Maru* ran against a Chinese river steamer on the Yangtsze River by the name of *Hsin Ta-ming* and caused more than 450 persons to be drowned. The total loss due to this incident was estimated to be over \$200,000, aside from the loss of lives.

March 2, the Japanese unlawfully set up a police force at Amoy, who falsely dressed up in Chinese uniforms and went into Chinese territory to arrest four naturalized Chinese Korean citizens without any justification.

March 20, two Japanese marines ruthlessly murdered a Chinese richsha coolie on Miller Road in Shanghai without any justification.

March 27, Japanese marines at Amoy tore down a Chinese flag and arrested eight Kuomintang workers.

April 20, Japanese soldiers in Tsinan shot one Chinese.

May 3, the beginning of the Tsinan Incident, the Japanese soldiers at Tsinan ruthlessly murdered the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs together with his staff, mutilated his body, and raided the office of the Commissioner.

May 5, Japanese soldiers at Tsinan fired on the Chinese troops and killed several hundred persons, both soldiers and civilians.

May 8, the Japanese troops bombarded the walled city of Tsinan without any provocation, and killed more than one thousand unarmed civilians.

The above mentioned incidents show clearly how Japan has purposely planned out her activities in China in recent months prior to the Tsinan Incident.

CHAPTER IX

THE TSINAN INCIDENT

When the Northern Expedition of the Nationalist armies was in full progress last year the Japanese authorities kept their eyes wide open to watch for opportunities to gain some special privileges or advantages thereby. As a consequence, when the Nationalist armies were arriving at Shantung, Japan sent an army of invasion to that province under the pretext of protecting her subjects, but in reality, to block the northern advance of the Nationalists. Fortunately, through a split in the Nationalist Government, the northern expedition did not go very far, and so the "Tsinan Incident" was temporarily postponed until this year. If the Nationalists had kept on with their expedition last year, the "Tsinan Incident" would have taken place a year ago, as this incident was a premeditated affair of the Japanese authorities.

This year, the Nationalists started their northern campaign again, and when they reached the Shantung border, the Japanese army of invasion came once more to continue their sinister work of attempting to create an incident in order to block the

Nationalists from going any further north; but fortunately, the advance of the Nationalists was too rapid, and before the Japanese troops were able to arrive at Tsinan, the Nationalists had already captured that city. This caused a great disappointment to the Japanese promoters of this adventurous enterprise, so unless they could find an excuse to create an incident, their adventure would be a total failure.

When the Japanese troops reached Tsinan, they immediately took possession of the commercial section of the city and set up their barricades there.

The starting point of the clash which occurred on May 3rd was due to the attempt on the part of a certain number of Chinese soldiers to cross the area under Japanese occupation, which was refused by the Japanese soldiers. Arguments were then started, which led to a clash between the two forces on the streets.

In order to show that they were not responsible for the incident, the Japanese purposely removed their barricades just before the clash.

Following the clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers on the streets, there were fires from Japanese machine guns.

This continued for sometime; then in the evening, the office of the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was raided by the Japanese soldiers, and the Commissioner himself and his whole staff were taken prisoners, and later, they were murdered, and their bodies mutilated.

After the clash had started, the Nationalist troops were ordered by their commanders to stop firing, and in order to avoid further trouble they were slowly withdrawing to the outskirts of the city. But the Japanese troops continued on their offensive. The next thing they did was the destruction of the Tsinan wireless station in order to prevent the Chinese side of the story from spreading out to the world. As the Chinese troops had withdrawn, the Japanese took complete possession of the city. Since then this city has been in the hands of the Japanese.

Below is printed a number of public documents relating to this incident. The readers may judge for themselves the value of these documents.

**Nationalists Protest Against
Japanese Landing of
Troops in Shantung**

April 22nd, 1928

“The Japanese Government, in May last year, when the northern expeditionary forces of the Nationalist Government were approaching the province of Shantung, suddenly despatched troops to that province. The Nationalist Government taking this action of the Japanese Government as an encroachment upon their territorial sovereignty and as a violation not only of the principles of international law but also of treaty stipulations, lodged a protest with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government. Although the troops sent from Japan to Shantung were subsequently withdrawn, the sense of resentment is still felt by the Chinese people over such a serious encroachment.

“Since the establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanking, orders have been repeatedly given to the military and civil officers to afford full protection to the lives and property of the nationals of friendly Powers. At the fourth plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held this spring, a

definite declaration was made to the same end. Recently General Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Forces, also issued from his headquarters an official proclamation holding all the Nationalist armies responsible for the protection of foreign lives and property. This proclamation was telegraphed on April sixteenth of this year to the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Kiangsu, who was instructed to request the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai to transmit the aforesaid proclamation to the Japanese Government. Further, it has been the especial endeavor of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government for the past few months to readjust, seriatim, all the outstanding questions with friendly Powers, in accordance with the foreign policy of the Nationalist Government and in a spirit of earnestness and sincerity with the view of removing misunderstandings and of promoting friendly relations.

“But, unfortunately the Japanese Government utterly disregard all these stern facts and at this time when the Nationalist armies are engaged in their second Northern Expedition and when the goal of China’s unification is in sight, again propose to despatch troops to Shantung. In doing so,

the Japanese Government are looking at the situation in the same false light as that of last May ; such an attitude is warranted neither by existing conditions nor by legal sanctions. This action not only constitutes a flagrant violation of principles of international law and treaty stipulations, but may also, it is to be feared, give rise to serious consequences, the responsibility for which it will be difficult to determine.

“The Nationalist Government fail to understand the object of the action taken by the Japanese Government. If it were for the prevention of possible danger to Japanese subjects in the war zone, means could easily be devised for ensuring their safety in conformity with the recognized usages of international law. Instead of resorting to this course, the Japanese Government choose to repeat their previous action by sending troops to China. Against this step of despatching troops to Shantung, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government is constrained to lodge with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government a strong protest and, at the same time, has to request the Japanese Government, in view of the friendly and amicable relations of the two peoples, to

reconsider their action, and immediately to stop sending all the forces destined for Shantung, to the end that the cordial relationship happily subsisting between the two nations may be maintained.

“The Minister for Foreign for Affairs of the Nationalist Government has the honor to present this Note in the expectation that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government will take note of its contents and favor him with a reply.”

Chinese Official Report

Nanking, May 5—Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hwang Fu, in a wireless message from Tsinan sent at 2 p. m. May 4, addressed to General Tan Yen-kai and other members of the Government Council, reported in detail the circumstances of the massacre of Nationalist Officials by the Japanese troops on May 3 substantially as follows:

“The immediate cause of the massacre by the Japanese troops arose when a Nationalist soldier passed through a street which had been previously included in the occupied area by the Japanese military authorities.

“After killing the soldier on the spot, a large detachment of Japanese troops was despatched to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs into which they immediately broke in Mr. Tsai Kung-sze, member of the Political Committee in the War Zone and concurrently Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Shantung, was dragged out, and bound with ropes. After cutting off his nose and gouging out his eyes, the Japanese troops shot him dead. Subsequently, the Bureau was set on fire.

“Later, the same Japanese soldiers turned to the Tsinan office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, failing to find the Minister there, they likewise set fire to the building.

“While these atrocities were taking place, other large units of Japanese troops, directing an organized gun-fire upon Nationalist soldiers and civilian Chinese, killing a great number of them, also arrived at Nationalist military posts and forcibly disarmed our soldiers. All this took place on the forenoon of the 3rd inst.

“In the evening while high Military Commanders of the Nationalist Forces were discussing with the Japanese Commanders, concerning various rehabilitation measures,

the Japanese troops again shelled our military quarters, destroying our wireless station. At the time of the despatching of this message, firing by Japanese troops has not yet stopped.

“This untoward event occurred when soldiers were quite a distance from the Japanese troops. But against these outrageous and atrocious acts of the Japanese troops, the Nationalist soldiers, in order to properly protect themselves, could not but reply to the firing.

“Those killed and injured (of our men) number over 1,000.”

(Signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK
HWANG FU.

The Chinese Protest

The official Chinese protest which was written by Mr. Hwang Fu in Tsinan and telegraphed to Baron Tanaka by Mr. Wunszu King, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in the evening of Friday, May 4 was as follows.

“The despatch of troops to Shangtung by Japan violates China's territorial sovereignty. The Nationalist Government have twice protested against this action and also

declared that, should unfortunate consequences result therefrom, the Japanese Government would have to bear the responsibility, etc. To my greatest surprise, the Japanese soldiers in Tsinan in the morning of May 3, without any reason whatsoever, committed the most provocative acts and fired ruthlessly at our soldiers and people. Thereupon the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief ordered his troops to keep away from the neighborhood of the region occupied by the Japanese soldiers, and at the same time instructed high military officers to hasten to the Japanese headquarters to arrange measures for the prevention of a possible clash. Our representatives were repeatedly insulted and no result was reached. The Japanese troops swept the neighborhood with machine gun fire and repeatedly directed their big guns at buildings of the government and of the people. A group of Japanese soldiers was sent to attack the office of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Shantung. After having cut off the ears and nose of Mr. Tsai Kung-shih, the Commissioner, the soldiers murdered him and all the members of the staff then present in cold blood. The temporary office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was also fired on and searched by organized Japanese soldiery.

Countless Chinese soldiers and citizens were murdered. The Japanese troops invaded the region occupied by Nationalist soldiers and compelled them to disarm. The Nationalist soldiers refrained from opposing them. At 11 p.m. May 3 while our high military authorities were negotiating with Col. Kuroda, the Japanese chief-of-staff as to steps that could be taken, the Japanese soldiers fired with their big guns five times and Japanese soldiers were also sent to destroy our wireless station. On May 4th, although there was not one single Chinese soldier anywhere near the neighborhood of the region occupied by the Japanese troops, the firing was continued by the latter up to the present communication, and business in the whole city is at a standstill. Condemnable actions like these are not only trampling under foot completely China's sovereign rights, but are also absolutely unpermissible by human justice.

"Now therefore, the Nationalist Government again has to lodge with the Japanese Government the strongest protest and has to request the Japanese Government to instruct by telegraph their troops at Tsinan to stop forthwith their firing and to withdraw at once. All the questions relat-

ing to the violation of international law and treaty stipulations as a result of stationing of Japanese troops in Shantung shall be settled through proper procedure. The Nationalist Government wish also now to declare that they reserve the right to present all necessary demands. It is presumed that the Japanese Government are unwilling to assume an outrageous, intolerable and hostile position against the whole Chinese race, which position is also against the dictates of justice and humanity.

(Signed) HWANG FU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs."

**Gen. Chiang Kai-shek's Letter to
the Japanese Commander in
Tsinan, Gen. Fukuda**

May 5, 1928

"Sir :

Since the unfortunate affair of the 3rd inst. the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Forces, being desirous of a peaceful settlement has strictly ordered his soldiers to withdraw from the neighborhood of the areas occupied by Japanese troops. All Nationalist soldiers have now evacuated their posts and are resuming the Northern Expedition, only a required number of the

Nationalist troops being stationed in the city for the maintenance of peace and order.

“The Nationalist Commander-in-Chief is likewise departing for the front today, and accordingly communicates to you the above effect, with the hope that you will strictly order the cessation of such unusual actions of your troops as shown in the last two days so as to facilitate the maintenance of friendly feelings between the two nations. This is his sincere hope.

(Signed) “CHIANG KAI-SHEK
Commander-in-Chief of the
Nationalist Forces.”

“May 5, 1928.”

**The Ultimatum of Gen. Fukuda to
Gen. Chiang Kai-shek
May 7, 1928**

“The occurrence of such an ‘unpropitious’ incident of this time originated in the non-compliance of the pledge on the part of the Nationalist Army, notwithstanding Gen. Chiang Kai-shek has several times promised to Chinese and foreign concerns in Tsinan that the Nationalists, on entering Tsinan, will not commit any unruly act whatsoever. The Commander

of the Japanese Army in Tsinan can no more bear to overlook the cruelties done by the Southern troops. All the official negotiations will be conducted by the Government of Japan against the Chinese authorities, while, from the need of future military arrangement, this Commander places before the Nationalist Army authorities the following demands :

1. Punishment of high military officers who are connected with the incident.

2. To disarm the whole of the Nationalist troops who had molested the Japanese in the presence of the Japanese army in Tsinan.

3. To evacuate all the Nationalist troops stationed in Hsinchuan and Changchiachuan within twelve hours.

4. To promptly prohibit all anti-Japanese propaganda.

5. To clear all the Nationalist armies in the area within 20 li (about 7 miles) of Tsinan and those in the area within 20 li along the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway."

On receiving the above demands, Gen. Chiang Tso-pin, the Chief of the Nationalist Political Commission at the front, personally visited the Japanese Consulate-General at

12 o'clock, midnight, of May 7 and asked the Japanese authorities to wait for a formal reply until sometime later, as Gen. Chiang Kai-shek was not in Tsinan and he was not in a position to give out any authoritative reply on military affairs, although, in substance, he, the former General, was in the position to be able to comply with the demands made by the Japanese army.

General Fukuda, having received this reply, considered it unsatisfactory, and decided to take a "free action", and ordered full preparation in order to come out in a positive military action.

Then he ordered a bombardment of the walled-city of Tsinan on the early morning of May 8 and after a bombardment of two days, succeeded in killing or evicting the Nationalist troops and capturing the city. The Chinese casualties have not been accurately stated, but according to reports by foreign missionaries, they have been placed at 2,000 killed and a similar number wounded.

The Chinese Casualty List

According to the Tsinan Foreign Relations Committee which has made an investigation of the total number of deaths

and injuries on the Chinese side, the total list of deaths is 3,625, injured 1,455, and the amount of property destroyed is estimated to be more than \$25,900,00. Details of the list are given as follows.

254 killed by hand knives, 22 buried by Japanese, 1105 shot to death, 147 killed by firing from machine guns, 44 killed by accident through firing from Japanese machine guns, 578 buried by the Red Cross Society, 510 buried by the Red Swastika Society.

Among the deaths, 2100 are males, 66 females, 578 buried by the Red Cross Society who cannot be identified, 510 buried by the Red Swastika Society who also cannot be identified.

The occupations of those who died were as follows: farmers 38, laborers 55, businessmen 2115, students 2, soldiers 216, unidentified due to burial by the Red Cross Society 578, unidentified due to burial by the Red Swastika Society 510.

The number of persons injured is as follows: 1 wounded by hand knife, 79 wounded by firing from machine guns, 25 due to accident from the firing of machine guns, causes of injury unknown and now in the hands of the Red Cross Society 613,

causes of injury unknown and now in the hands of the Red Swastika Society 510.

Among those injured 80 are males, 25 females, unidentified in the hands of the Red Cross Society 613, unidentified in the hands of the Red Swastika Society 533, unidentified in the Republican Hospital 199.

Among the injured were 19 farmers, 19 laborers, 57 business men, 19 soldiers, occupations unknown now in the hands of the Red Cross Society 613, in the hands of the Red Swastika Society 533.

Among the deaths who were buried by relatives or friends or abandoned by the Japanese on the streets number 2,538, those who were buried by the Red Cross Society 578, buried by the Swastika Society 501.

Among the injured, those who look after their own wounds were 100, those who were taken care of by the Republican Hospital 199, those who were taken care of by the Red Cross Society 613, those who were taken care of by the Red Swastika Society 533.

The detailed list of the amount of property damaged or destroyed is as follows:

Public property including the city wall \$125,350, the Tsinan Arsenal and the Gun Powder Depot \$7,000,000, the wireless station \$2,000,000, articles lost or destroyed in the public organizations \$1,000,000, destruction of the railroad bridge of the Yellow River \$100,000, destruction of the railroad material at Tang-chuang \$150,000, destruction of private buildings and structures \$701,793.60, business and industrial losses due to the Japanese bombardment of the city at the rate of \$600,000 per day, for one month \$18,000,000.

The above list is the first detailed statement issued by the Chinese concerning the damages and losses caused by the Japanese lawlessness at Tsinan since the bombardment. According to the report of the investigators, the above mentioned list only contains the material so far obtained, as it is very hard to collect accurate data under the Japanese military domination.

China Presents Her Case to the World

The Nationalist Government on May 11 published the text of the appeal addressed to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, by General Tan

Yen-kai, Chairman of the Nationalist Government Council, protesting against the action of the Japanese troops at Tsinanfu. The appeal reads as follows:—

“On behalf of the Nationalist Government of the Chinese, I, the chairman of the said Government, beg to draw your attention to the grave situation which arises from the dispatching of large number of Japanese troops into the Chinese Province of Shantung, and their hostilities committed therein which amount to acts of war against China.

“On May 3, Japanese troops at Tsinan, capital of Shantung, fired upon Chinese soldiers and civilians without any provocation on the part of the latter, and then set guns firing on surrounding residential quarters with the result of more than one thousand casualties. What is more horrible is that a party of Japanese soldiers invaded the office of our Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Tsinan, arrested him, and after having his ears and nose cut off, shot him, together with the members of his staff, to death, on the very spot.

“On May 7, the Japanese military authority at Tsinan sent a note with unreasonable and impossible demands to our

Commander-in-Chief and set 12 hours for reply. Without waiting for our reply, the Japanese troops again started warlike action on a more extensive scale, which have not ceased at the time of wiring. Besides, more Japanese troops were landed and naval forces are being dispatched to Chinese territories. In spite of all this, our military and civil authorities have throughout the whole time acted with utmost self-restraint in conformity with government orders.

"I, hereby, take the liberty to call your attention to the fact that the territorial integrity and political independence of China have been ruthlessly violated and the peace of nations is threatened by the aggression on the part of Japan. You are urgently requested to summon a meeting of the Council of the League in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the League Covenant.

"It is earnestly urged that the League shall request the cessation of hostilities on the part of Japanese troops and their immediate withdrawal from Shantung. As regards the final settlement of the whole affair, the Nationalist Government being fully conscious of the righteousness of its cause, is prepared to agree to any proper

arrangement for an International enquiry or Arbitration. “(Signed) Tan Yen-kai, Chairman, Nationalist Government Council.”

A reply from Geneva was received on May 13 to the effect that as the Nanking Government was not a member of the League it had hardly any standing. Chen Lu, the Chinese Minister at Paris, who is a member of the League Council, appealed to Peking for instructions with a view to urging the Peking Government join in the appeal. It is stated that Japan is also ready to submit her case to Geneva. Reuter's correspondent at Geneva comments that any action by the Council would be ineffectual as it would be impossible to define the aggressor.

There are three points that our readers should notice in considering the Tsinan Incident. These points are as follows:

1. In the city of Tsinan there is no foreign settlement like Shanghai or Tientsin except a part of that city has been designated by the Chinese Government as a commercial center to facilitate trading with foreigners. When the Japanese troops arrived Tsinan, they immediately occupied the commercial section of the city and set up their barracks here. This is a pure case of violation of

China's sovereignty. The sending of an army into the city of Tsinan is quite different from the sending of troops to Shanghai by the British and Americans a year ago, as in Shanghai there is a foreign settlement, and the British and American troops were only staying in the settlements.

2. Before the landing of Japanese in Tsingtao, the port of entry for the whole province of Shantung, the Chinese Government has lodged several protests against these unlawful actions of the Japanese Government. Not only is the landing of troops in Tsingtao unlawful, but all the subsequent acts of occupying the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad, the occupation and bombardment of the city of Tsinan, and other similar events based upon this initial act of landing troops at Tsingtao are all illegal. So the question of who started the first blow in the Tsinan clash is immaterial, as long as the landing of troops and the subsequent invasion of Tsinan is unlawful.

3. Diplomatic officers have certain privileges and immunities that are recognized by all civilized countries as valid principles under international law. Now immediately following the clash between the Japanese troops and the Nationalist forces on the

3rd of May, the Japanese soldiers raided the office of the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, mutilated his body, then killed him and his staff. There is no grosser violation of international law than the acts of this nature.

Aside from the above mentioned three significant points there are still many other minor points, such as the ruthless murder of unarmed civilians and wounded soldiers, the bombardment of the walled city of Tsinan with artillery which practically destroyed all the gates of the city wall, the illegal declaration of twenty li on each side of the Kiaochow Tsinan Railroad to be their military zone, are also significant acts of violation of international law.

CHAPTER X

THE MURDER OF CHANG TSO-LIN

The murder of Chang Tso-lin is a unique international crime of modern history. Never has anywhere in the world an international crime of such a magnitude been committed. The blasting of the train where Chang Tso-lin was riding back from Peking to his native province was altogether a prearranged affair done by the military experts of China's aggressive neighbor, the Japanese Empire. This crime may also be deemed as a wonderful achievement of modern international intrigue. The ruthless murder of an important political personage within his own country, by an organized foreign political gang, and the shrewd way of shifting the responsibility for such a crime to some ignoramous and insignificant persons, can, indeed, find no parallel in modern history.

While the official report of a "bogus" investigation drawn up by the Japanese, the reponsible party for the crime, and compelled the Chinese to sign, but refused by the latter, cannot be available at present,

the report given out by Reuter's Agency is of great interest. Below is printed a copy of the same for the reference of those who are interested in this crime. After a perusal of the report below, no doubt, every reader will be convinced of how hard Japan is working to get control of the three Chinese Eastern Provinces.

Shanghai, July 16, 1928.

"The bomb outrage at Mukden on June 4 which resulted in the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, commonly known as the Dictator, and General Wu Chun-Sheng, his most trusted lieutenant, who was Governor of Heilungkiang and acting Governor of Manchuria, seems likely to become one of the crimes of history. Despite the fact that a Sino-Japanese Committee of Inquiry was formed to investigate and to discover the plotters immediately after the outrage, no authentic statement had been issued up to the present, it being understood that the Chinese members of the Joint Committee refused to sign the report drawn up by the Japanese members.

"As it is historically important that all the light possible should be thrown on the affair, we trust the following report on an

independent investigation made on the spot will be found of interest.

“When even a very small railway accident happens, it is in all civilized countries customary for the authorities to make a most thorough investigation of the accident in order to find where to lay the responsibility for it. And when a crime is committed, the authorities will spare no effort in trying to find the culprit. But when in China a whole train, carrying as passengers a number of prominent people, including the head of the government, is wilfully blown up, the whole thing is attributed to some mysterious “reds” or “plain clothes agents”—and the case is hushed up.

“Similar methods might have worked successfully during the Middle Ages, but the present times and the present public require the truth about such accidents, even if the truth be rather embarrassing for certain parties. In the present case, the truth has been so shamefully distorted and hidden behind official smokescreens and deliberate journalistic lies, that even people not very well versed in Oriental politics must have suspected that they were being deceived.

“The author of the following lines has had the opportunity of closely following and

studying the circumstances both before and after the accident, and believes himself therefore capable of laying the facts before the public. The facts he believes to be indisputable—he leaves it to the public to draw the conclusions.

I.—Arrangement of Special Train Carrying Marshal Chang and Suite.

2—Locomotives.

3—3rd class cars for bodyguards.

3—1st class cars for some cabinet Ministers, adjutants, Marshal Chang's third son and others.

1—Tsin-Pu railway 1st class steel car ("Blue Express") for some Cabinet ministers.

1—Peking-Mukden railway private car (No. 80) for Marshal Chang.

1—Dining car.

9—Cars for suite, guards, baggage, etc.

II.—Description of Place Where Disaster Occurred.

"The disaster took place just where the South Manchuria railway between Mukden and Changchun on a viaduct crosses the Peking-Mukden railway between Huang Ku-tun and Mukden City station.

“The viaduct consists of three spans, supported by two piers in the middle and buttresses at both ends. Both piers and buttresses are of granite masonry, the former with a core of concrete and measuring about 6 feet across. The steel bridges, each more than 30 feet long, are of heavy construction; the beams being about 5 feet high.

“Close to the viaduct, at the base of the South Manchurian Railway embankment, there are three blockhouses built for the Japanese railway guards, two on the east side and one on the west side. They are made of railway sleepers and surrounded by barbed wire entanglements.

III.—Disaster, as told by eyewitnesses, mostly passengers on the train.

“At about 5:30 on the Morning of June 4th the train was approaching the fatal crossing, having passed Huang Ku-tun station without stopping and running on the northern track of the Peking Mukden Railway. At the moment Marshal Chang's car passed the viaduct, a terrific explosion occurred, which was heard all over Mukden. A few seconds after the explosion the passengers in the train heard a thundering crash, evidently caused by the steel spans of the S.M.R. viaduct falling down but after the crash it stopped.

"The body guards on the train immediately alighted and finding nobody round, started firing in the air as a demonstration and alarmed signal. The firing was only kept up for a few minutes.

"Shortly afterwards Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Wu Chun-sheng, who had been sitting together in the observation room in the center of the former's car were taken out and attended to. Both were seriously injured ; Chang was taken away by a Ford driven to his Mansion in the city. Wu was put in a carriage and taken to a Japanese hospital where he passed away about an hour later. All the other wounded persons were also taken out of the cars and attended to.

"The disaster claimed only two fatal casualties among the men of political importance, viz., Marshal Chang, at whom the plot was primarily aimed, and Wu. Several other prominent people were, however, more or less seriously injured, the following being a list of them: Mo Teh-hui, ex-Civil Governor of Fengtien and Minister of Agriculture; Yu Kuo-han, Chief of Staff; Chang Ching-hui, Minister of War; Liu Tse, Minister of Education; Wu Chin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chen Chi-yun,

private secretary to Marshal Chang; and Major Giga, Japanese military adviser.

IV.—Effects of Explosion.

“(a) Both steel bridges of the northern span and the eastern bridge of the central span were blown down at the ends where they were supported by the northern pier; the western bridge of the central span was dislodged.

“(b) The explosion completely wrecked the Marshal's car and the dining car and partly the blue steel car in the front. The significant fact in this connection is that while the roofs and walls of the cars were completely smashed to shreds the chassis were left almost intact. As was the track underneath. The body of the Marshal's car and the dining car were afterwards completely destroyed by fire and it has therefore been impossible to ascertain if the damage to these cars was caused by the air pressure of the explosion, by the falling steel bridges or by fire.

“In the case of the blue steel car, however, it is quite clear that the damage was done by the air pressure of the explosion and that the explosion took place on the right (south) side of the car. This car had

thus evidently just passed the northern pier when the explosion occurred and had time to escape being damaged by the falling bridge.

V.—Conclusion regarding source of explosion.

“From above facts the following conclusions must be drawn :

“1. The explosion was caused by a great quantity of high explosives, placed on the northern pier underneath and beside the northern and central spans of the bridges. Thus on the South Manchuria Railway track.

“2. The ignition of the blasting charges must have been done electrically from a safe distance from the bridge. This necessitates elaborate preparations with electric detonators and connecting wires.

“3. The placing of the explosives and their ignition was done with considerable skill and forethought. The whole arrangement and its complete success unmistakably denotes the hands of trained and capable sappers.

“4. Experts agree that the installation of the blasting charges with detonators and connecting wires must have taken four or five experienced men six hours to complete.

VI.—Some Japanese explanations of disaster.

“Immediately after the accident, various Japanese news agencies circulated different “explanations” of it. As these reports have been widely spread and telegraphed round the world it will be necessary to scrutinize their validity.

(a) The “bomb” theory.

“In their first reports the Japanese news agencies gave out that the havoc was wrought by “bombs” thrown at the train by Southern plain dressed agents. As proof for this was largely circulated a photograph of two Mill’s hand-grenades in a washing basin, supposed to have been found near the viaduct and a photograph of two dead Chinese, who were stated to have been shot by the Japanese railway guards the day before the accident. Anybody who has seen the effect of the explosion in question will at once see the absurdity of such a story. Besides, the whole population of Mukden can testify that one and only one explosion was heard. Why and how the two Chinese were shot has never been explained by the Japanese authorities.

(b) The “mine on the Peking-Mukden Railway track” theory.

"The next theory put forth by the Japanese, even by their official investigation committee, was that a charge of high explosive had been put at the foot of the stone pier on the Peking-Mukden Railway track. The above related facts show clearly that this is quite impossible, as both the foot of the pier, the railway track and the steel frames of the cars were quite intact.

(c) The "Mine on board the train" theory.

"In his official protest, filed with the Mukden Foreign Intercourse Office on June 7, the Japanese Consul-General, without giving any tangible evidence, asserts that the disaster was caused by explosives placed inside some of the cars of the train. This assertion is also absolutely irreconcilable with the above described effects of the explosion. If the explosion had taken place inside a car, the chassis would certainly have been damaged first, and secondly it is quite impossible to understand how the pier and the steel bridges could have been so thoroughly destroyed, especially how could the central bridge have been blown up and turned round 180 degrees?

VII.—Responsibility for guarding the scene of the disaster.

“The viaduct is of course situated within the South Manchurian Railway zone, which is protected and patrolled by the Japanese authorities only. It is, however, also the point of intersection between this railway and the Peking-Mukden railway, which is guarded and patrolled by the Chinese. Long before the accident happened, some friction seems to have existed between the two parties regarding the guarding of this particular spot. Some how or other some agreement seems to have been made according to which each party should guard its own tracks. This agreement has been repeatedly referred to in Japanese press statements. The Chinese, however, claim that their guards were prevented from effectually guarding the spot because they were not allowed to come within 200 yards of the viaduct. This may be considered indirectly confirmed by the statement issued by the Tokyo War Office on June 18, which, however, appears to have been purposely worded ambiguously and obscurely:

“At the point of crossing the Chinese guards were under the command of Lt. Kin, who speaks and understands Japanese quite well. The guards were stationed there at 8 p.m. on June 8 and while Japanese

guards were sent on to the South Manchurian Railway (which crosses the Peking-Mukden Railway line at this point) they kept watch to within about 200 metres from where the bombing took place. During day-time watch was kept by keeping a strict look out in all directions, but at night the spot was patrolled."

"It is impossible to understand how a spot can be "patrolled at a distance of 200 metres" but it is quite clearly stated that the Japanese guards were sent to the South Manchurian Railway bridge, on which the explosion took place. That the viaduct was quite efficiently guarded by the Japanese is confirmed by various witnesses who agree that during the days immediately proceeding the outrage, Japanese sentries were invariably posted at the viaduct, either on the top of the embankment or on the Huangkutun road.

"The Japanese official investigation committee states also that the spot was patrolled throughout the night preceding the fatal morning, and that one of the sentries actually saw the explosion. Chinese witnesses declare that people coming from Mukden who wanted to pass through the viaduct in the early morning were

refused passage by Japanese sentries posted on the road of the crossing.

“A Joint Sino-Japanese Committee was immediately formed to investigate the affair and endeavor to discover the plotter but no authentic statement has been issued up to the present. It is understood that the Japanese members of the Committee presented a report, but the Chinese members refused to sign it.”

The above report given by Reuters' shows clearly how well the Japanese have worked out their scheme of murder, with their authorities and journalists working in co-operation to deceive the world in order to evade her responsibility for the crime.

What the British Publicist, Putnam Weale, Has to Say

Peking, Aug. 14.

Putnam Weale (Mr. B. Lenox Simpson), who has been in Mukden for Chang Tso-lin's funeral ceremonies, interviewed by foreign correspondents here to-day, gave a startling version of the assassination of the late Marshal.

After making a close investigation on the spot, he asserted, it was his belief that

the murder was committed by a Japanese secret society, whose work was facilitated by certain people in the Japanese Army.

Mr. Weale opened by saying that the situation in Manchuria was fraught with many possibilities. The conversations between Baron Hayashi and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had been kept secret, but there was reason to believe that they were directed towards determining the relations between Mukden and Nanking and securing the execution of the new railway scheme projected early this year, which was initialled in Peking before Chang Tso-lin's departure, but so far had not been ratified by the Three Eastern Provinces. He believed that the quarrels between Mukden and Japan centred on this railway question.

A masked struggle, he said, had been going on concerning the new railways which the Chinese were building. If, as the Japanese desired, these railways were consolidated with the South Manchurian Railway system, it would establish Japanese paramountcy in North Manchuria as securely as in South Manchuria, but the Chinese had not ratified the agreement and their lines now tapped the rich grain-bearing Northern areas and ran to the seaboard.

Mr. Weale asserted that Japan's desire to obtain paramountcy in North as well as South Manchuria was the explanation of the constant statement that she was willing to give up extraterritoriality in Manchuria as an experiment.

Flag Hoisting Stopped

"Obviously," said he, "if the entire region beyond the Great Wall was under the effective control of one chartered company, the relinquishment of so-called judicial rights would be an illusory gain to Chinese territorial administration."

Regarding the compromise between Mukden and Nanking, Mr. Weale stated that it had been arranged to hoist the Nationalist flag in Mukden on August 10, but on August 9 Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang received a fresh, definite warning from Japan that such action would be construed as a highly unfriendly act.

"As there were 17,000 Japanese troops at the gates of Mukden, the Manchurian authorities were forced to break their definite undertaking with General Chiang Kai-shek," he remarked.

With reference to the assassination of Marshal Chang, Mr. Weale asserted that

after Marshal Yang Yu-ting's outburst against the proposed Morgan loan last November and the refusal of the Three Eastern Provinces to ratify the railway scheme agreement, the breach between Mukden and Tokyo widened. "Therefore Chang Tso-lin made his peace offer on September 5, which Japan countered with advice to 'Evacuate Peking before it is too late'.....Chang Tso-lin's assassination on June 4 was not a fortuitous event but it followed as a logical sequence," asserted Mr. Weale.

A Strange Revelation

He said that the official report of the Sino-Japanese investigation had not been published but the copy he had seen contained "one strange revelation. It is stated that the Japanese military command consented to the Chinese gendarmes patrolling the Peking-Mukden Railway at the bridge where the tragedy occurred but in the following paragraph the Chinese investigators state that this permission was vetoed by the higher Japanese command, the gendarmes being kept 300 metres from the fatal bridge."

Independent foreign investigations by explosive experts, Mr. Weale went on to

say, had established almost conclusively that the train had been destroyed by dynamite, probably numbering 12 charges each of not more than eight pounds, which were pegged into the granite piers supporting the steel girders of the South Manchurian Railway viaduct.

He pointed out that the tragedy occurred on the seventeenth of the lunar month, when night visibility was good.

Mr. Weale stated that he interviewed a Chinese at a lumber-yard less than 100 yards from the bridge, who stated that on the fatal night he saw figures moving about the bridge, who (said Mr. Weale) must have been seen by the Japanese sentries.

"The crime," he declared, "was the work of bad men and certain people in the Japanese Army facilitated their work. There have long been in Japan organizations similar to the Serbian organizations which carried out the Sarajevo crime, for instance, the Black Dragon Society, which specializes in Chinese affairs and originated the Twenty-One Demands, and which notoriously employs men of the Soshi class such as were deported by the Japanese civil authorities from Mukden after the murder."

“Who Killed Our Father?”

“Many curious things are coming to light,” Mr. Weale continued. “It is alleged that the Ford car which conveyed Chang Tso-lin to his yamen from the wreck had been waiting 300 yards from the scene, while a Chinese servant has testified to me that a prominent official living two miles from the scene rose at dawn on June 4 and remained at his roof-side with field-glasses fixed on the bridge until the explosion. After the explosion none of the things expected occurred. There was no revolt of the troops, no disorders, no collapse, except that the Chinese met the situation with caution. Chang Hsueh-liang entered Mukden disguised as a common soldier in a troop-train. Although he is almost overwhelmed by the task confronting him he is not faltering. Chang Tso-lin’s younger sons are going to one foreign friend and another asking ‘Who killed our father?’ but receive no reply.

“That the Japanese Government, as in 1895 in Korea, will ultimately feel called upon to defend itself against the charge of complicity, by ordering all suspected persons to be arrested and tried, is the belief of those who have seen how strong is the evidence in the very stones of the South Manchurian Railway,” concluded Mr. Weale.

CHAPTER XI

THE JAPANESE NEWS AGENCIES AND THE TSINAN INCIDENT

Japan's aggressive policy works out pretty well in China with the aid of her three propaganda agencies, the *Toho News Service*, the *Nippon Denpo Service*, and the *Nippon Rengo News Service*, which are heavily subsidized by the Japanese Government to carry on its propaganda work throughout the world, especially in China, as this latter country still lacks the necessary organs to transmit its news within the country as well as abroad.

Originally Japan did not have any news agencies like the above mentioned ones, but later the Japanese authorities felt the need of such so they advocated the idea of buying certain foreign news services and then developing them with the assistance of foreign experts, until they are now becoming powerful institutions throughout the entire world, with their foreign staffs completely eliminated.

At present, the majority of the telegraphic news printed in the Chinese papers throughout China are being transmitted through these Japanese services, as their rates are cheaper than those of any other service, being thirty times cheaper than the rates charged by the old British Reuters' Service. These Japanese services are especially active in Northern China.

The *Toho Service* is about the strongest Japanese service in China, which practically monopolizes the intellectual current of China through its news and propaganda items given to the Chinese papers

It would, indeed, be a long time before China can work out an efficient news service to compete with the Japanese agencies. It is rather unfortunate that China cannot compete with Japan in this respect. As long as China cannot do this, the political thought of her people will be dominated by the authorities of Japan, who direct their news agencies in China to spread out whatever rumours or propaganda items to feed upon the Chinese people as they desire. It is quite safe to say that many of China's complicated political questions are due to the rumours spread out by the Japanese agencies

When the writer was travelling through Manchuria sometime ago, one very shocking incident he noticed was the amount of rumour or propaganda broadcasted by the Japanese news agencies and daily papers published in the Chinese language under their control. These Japanese agencies and newspapers systematically spread out rumours to create enmity among the Chinese leaders in order to disturb their real intentions whenever and wherever they can. A few instances of their systematic propaganda may be given as follows:

When Chang Tso-lin's train was blasted by the Japanese as indicated by both Reuters' and Chinese reports, yet the first Japanese cable report sent out and printed in all the Chinese as well as foreign papers contained an item which reads something like this, "The Southern plain-clothes men are responsible."

Another instance of their systematic propaganda may be given below. Apparently the Japanese authorities are not very sympathetic with the work of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, so they purposely spread rumours against him. Thus in the news sheets of the Toho Service for June 5th we find the following items:

"Toho Service, Hankow, June 5.—The 12th, 17th, and 36th Wuhan Army (formerly under the command of Teng Sheng-chi), was ordered to proceed North by General Li Tsung-jen. Pei Chung-hsi also left for the North this morning."

"The northward movement of the Wuhan army is ostensibly to participate in the Northern Expedition, but in reality simply intriguing to block the growing influence of Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan."

The above brief item shows clearly how effective the Japanese news agencies can spread propaganda through their news items.

When the recent Tsinan Incident occurred, the first thing the Japanese did after the clash between their army of occupation and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army was the breaking down of the wireless station in the city of Tsinan in order to prevent any information to be sent out from the Chinese sources to state the Chinese side of the case. So for the first few days following the occurrence of the Incident, there was no information coming from the Chinese sources except certain official protests made by the Chinese commanders and their Minister of Foreign Affairs.

When the first news of the Incident came out through the Japanese sources, they were all accusing the Chinese for their mischiefs and initial hostile acts against the Japanese. Whether the Chinese were right or wrong in this recent Incident, the world was immediately led to believe through the Japanese agencies that Japan was on the right side. When the Chinese version of the incident had reached the outside world through the mail, the whole world had already received the first and lasting impression, which no later Chinese rebuttal can overcome in any effective way.

A comparison between the news of the murder of Chang Tso-lin by the Japanese as clearly elucidated by Reuters' Service, which are being printed elsewhere in this book, and the Japanese account of the "responsibility of the Southern plain-clothesmen" is certainly interesting.

Of course, the establishment of a national news service is a part of modern national organization, every Western nation has such organizations within its borders to unite the political thoughts and feelings of its people in order to create a solid front toward all national and international problems. Up to the present time,

the Chinese leaders are not far sighted enough to see the necessity for such an organization. They are hallooing for national reunification, reconstruction, and a host of other programs, yet their own ideas are being dominated by certain foreign press agents. Until the Chinese authorities can see clearly the necessity of organizing an efficient national news agency to spread their own political ideas and doctrines, they can accomplish indeed very little in their programs of national reconstruction, and still less a good standing in international relations.

CHAPTER XII

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TSINAN INCIDENT

There is no doubt that Japan's occupation of Shantung is unlawful and the five demands that her military commander sent to China based upon this unlawful act is also unlawful.

In the first place, Japan is not treating China as an independent nation, and is sending her troops to China at her own free will, in spite of repeated protests from both the Peking and Nanking Governments. If Japan should treat China as such, then China has a perfect right not to listen to what she has to say. To make the situation clear, the following illustration may be used.

The landing of troops in Shantung is a pure case of invasion without any legal basis. In municipal law we call an act of unlawful entry into another person's house a trespass, and the landlord or occupant of the house may remove the intruder by force if necessary, and if the trespasser should refuse to leave the house, he may even be killed by the landlord in defence of himself

and his rights. Under the principles of the law, every man's house is his own castle, where no one can get in without his permission or invitation. This is the law of trespass. Now let us illustrate the case further.

Suppose A, the occupant of a certain house, is having some family trouble and quarrels with his wife, and B, an uninvited neighbor, who comes into A's house under the pretense of defending a grocery man, who happens to be in A's house, whom B claims to be his relative. But A does not invite B to come in, nor is the grocery man invited by A to be there, except at the moment the grocery man happens to come into A's house to get an order. When B comes into A's house under the pretense of protecting his relative, the grocery man, he arms himself with a revolver and other weapons. In the meantime as B is about to rush into the house, A tells him not to come in, unless he wants to assume the risk of being hit, but B refuses to listen and rushes himself in. As the result of B's forcible entry into the house, A becomes provoked and then the two quarrel together for a short while, and then B destroys many things in the house and kills many of A's

servants, and then drives A, the landlord, from his own house and occupies the same by himself. Suppose this case were brought to court, and you were the judge, what would you say? Do you think A, the landlord is right, or B, the intruder is right?

Now the Tsinan Incident is exactly like the illustration given above. China is engaged in a civil war, and Japan sends her troops to the scene of war under the pretense of protecting her nationals, in spite of repeated protests from China that her troops should not be there, but she does not listen to China's protests and unlawfully rushes into Tsinan, a city with no foreign settlements, except an ordinary city opened to foreign trade by China herself.

The real issue in this case is not who started the shooting or who did not start the trouble, it is the legal question involved—is the landing of Japanese troops in Shantung a lawful act under international law? This is a very simple case. If this one question could be answered then the whole issue involved in the Incident would be settled. The shooting, the damages, the deaths and injuries on both sides, are only secondary points. What stand would the Chinese authorities take?

One may argue again that Japan has certain special privileges in Shantung which necessitate her sending of troops there. In this connection it must be made clear that these so-called privileges were unlawfully taken from Germany during the European war without the sanction of China, the legal owner of them all.

A few years ago, Japan occupied Shantung and refused to return the same to China until China promised to pay her more than \$70,000,000. During that time the writer issued a statement concerning this question, which agrees with our present discussion, and a part of which may be quoted below.

“The Shantung case is one of relationship between landlord and tenant. It is best illustrated by the following: A leased a house to B, later C, an intruder, drove B out of the house and occupied it. Two years later, B was convicted for crime and transported across the seas. Now what is the legal status of the house? Who has legal right to it? Of course, A, the original owner alone has the right to it. C, the intruder, simply by driving B out, has not any more right to the house than a robber who robs a man on the highway and calls the booty his

property in the eyes of the law. So naturally the house should be unconditionally reverted back to A, the owner.

“Now let us apply this illustration to the Shantung case. In 1898, Germany forced China to lease Kiao-chow to her. This lease was not an outright concession. In this lease it was expressly stipulated that the political sovereignty will always remain in China, and that the relationship between China and Germany was that of landlord and tenant, and that Germany can only enjoy the economic privileges, such as building railroads, opening mines, building commercial cables, and the like. Thus the title to Kiao-chow still remains with China. In 1914 Japan captured Kiao-chow from Germany, and took possession of the territory. When China declared war on Germany in 1917, the leasehold had become *ipso facto* dissolved. The law of leasehold under international law has no material difference from that of the ordinary property law. Now Japan has claimed even more than Germany did by extending the sphere of influence of Kiao-chow to as far as Tsinan and other places in Shantung. From the above facts we see clearly that the title and right to the territory of Kiao-chow

as well as to Shantung are undisputedly vested in China, and Japan is simply an intruder."

Of course, the real intention of Japan is to reclaim back Tsingtao and the Kiaochow Tsinan Railroad as well as other additional unlawful privileges in China. But in spite of that, the whole situation is simply one pure legal issue, and should be solved through legal channels. It is interesting to watch what attitude the Nanking authorities would take in regard to this matter.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ATTITUDE CHINA SHOULD ADOPT TOWARD THE TSINAN INCIDENT

Since the days that China has come into contact with the Western Powers she has never had any definite policy in her dealings with them. She was always on the defensive side in every foreign issue, consequently, she was defeated on every side and fettered by the unequal treaties, and her rights have been also thus violated and her domains invaded at the free will of her aggressive neighbors.

The recent Japanese invasion of Shantung is one of these unlawful international outrages committed against China. Now in spite of Japan's unlawful act in sending troops to Shantung to purposely create an international situation, and refuses to evacuate at the request of China, she had also sent five demands to China for acceptance. Now what should the Chinese authorities do? To submit and accept these demands? Absolutely not. If Japan is strong enough let her hold Shantung but never give in. In

dealing with Japan concerning the Tsinan Incident, the following points should be adopted :

1. To organize a committee of investigation to obtain all the necessary evidences for future negotiations.

2. In view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese commercial treaty was terminated sometime ago through the expiration of its stipulated period, China should stand firm and immediately declare that treaty null and void, and before a new treaty is signed, Japan should be treated as a non-treaty Power, but the Chinese Minister at Tokio and all the Chinese Consuls in Japan should not be recalled, for if China should recall them, then Japan may openly declare war on China by utilizing this act as a pretext.

3. To deny everyone of the five unlawful demands set up by Japan and present the following counter-demands to her :

- a. Japan should acknowledge her act of sending troops to Shantung as unlawful.

- b. An apology from Japan for her violation of international law by sending troops to China.

c. Immediate withdrawal of all Japanese troops from Shantung.

d. Damages from Japan for the unlawful destruction of Chinese lives and property.

e. Severe punishment of General Fukuda, commander of the Japanese army of invasion for the criminal acts he has committed in Shantung.

4. No negotiations shall be started until Japan complies with the above conditions.

China's diplomatic failures in the past were due to her weakness in meeting her foreign problems like the recent Tsinan Incident. Now if Japan should refuse to abide by the above conditions, let her occupy Shantung or even another part of China as long as she wishes to until time has come when China will be strong enough to drive her out. In short, let Shantung be a Chinese Alsace-Lorraine, and let it be a memorial of Chinese national humiliation. On the other hand, if China should yield to the Japanese demands, more demands would come, and then there would be no hope for China to resist future aggressions by the other Powers who will follow the

foot steps of Japan. Be a defeated hero and not a conquered weakling! This is the attitude Nanking should adopt.

Furthermore, the sending of five demands to China now is only a preliminary step to something more drastic. If the Chinese authorities should concede to them, then another set of more important ones concerning damages, compensations for the sending of troops to China, problems relating to Mongolia and Manchuria, where she is also unlawfully claiming certain privileges, would be brought up and urged China to accept. On the other hand, if China should refuse to consider them all at this time, then Japan's drastic demands would be postponed. Let the Chinese authorities be fearless in meeting the unlawful demands of Japan. It is the courage that wins.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

After a perusal of the foregoing pages, the readers will no doubt obtain a general idea of the extent of Japan's aggression in China. Of course, Japan has her own excuse for such actions. Under our present day theories of national and international organization, aggression with force is still recognized by international law, and the sword is still the dictator of international justice. This is Japan's excuse.

What has China to say? To beg for sympathy from some quarters, or to beg for mercy from Japan? Which is the right procedure to take? It is, indeed, a great pity that certain Chinese leaders are trying to do both at the same time without finding other means to solve their country's problems.

'It is not saying too much that only China herself can cure her own sickness. Sympathy can only be accorded to the strong, and mercy to the victor. As long as the Chinese leaders cannot solve their own problems clearly by attempting to get at the

bottom of things, and build up a strong and efficient China economically, socially, politically, educationally, as well as materially, China will not be respected, and her rights will continue to be violated. To be strong and self-respecting should be China's domestic and foreign policy. What's the use to cry, "Down with Imperialism!" "Abrogate the Unequal Treaties!", when you have neither the strength nor the ability to do so? Why not try some better means: build up a strong China first?

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APPENDIX I.

Declaration made by Count Okuma to the United States on August 15, 1914

“Japan has no territorial ambition and hopes to stand as protector of peace in the Orient.”

Japanese ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914

The Japanese Government demands that Kiau-chau be ceded to Japan “with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.”

Declaration made by Count Okuma to the United States on August 24, 1914

“As premier of Japan I have stated and now again state that Japan has no ulterior motive nor desire to secure more territory, nor of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My government and my people have given their word, which will be honorably kept, as Japan always keeps her promise.”

**Statement of Vice Minister of the
Navy Suzuki, November 7, 1914**

“While the European war continues Tsing-tau will be administered by Japan. At the conclusion of the war Japan will open negotiations with China.”

(Note—It is interesting to note how the above statements and subsequent events coincide with each other.)

APPENDIX II.

Japanese population in China

I. Yangtze Valley

Shanghai	27,200 (Japanese 26,000 Korean 700 Taiwanese 500)
Soochow	150
Nanking	50
Wuhu	60
Kiukiang	60
Tayeh	15
Wuhan	15
Changsha	70
Yichang	30
Changteh	20

II. Southern China

Hangchow	40
Ningpo	30
Wenchow	10
Foochow	1,250 (Japanese 250 Taiwanese 1,000)
Amoy	6,800 (Japanese 300 Taiwanese 6,500)
Swatow	570 (Japanese 170 Taiwanese 400)
Canton	500 (Japanese 450 Taiwanese 50)

III. Northern China

Peking	2,000
Tientsin	550
Chefoo	230
Tsingtao	11,000
Outside of Tsingtao city limit	1,500
Fengtse	200
Changtien	200
Chaochuan	350
Paoshan	130
Tsinan	1,000
Lungkow	30

IV. Manchuria

Fengtien	50,000 (Japanese 40,000 Korean 10,000)
Harbin	16,000 (Japanese 4,000 Korean 12,000)
Changchun	4,500 (Japanese 1,500 Korean 3,000)
Antung	7,700 (Japanese 1,200 Korean 6,500)
Chientao	141,000 (Japanese 1,000 Korean 140,000)
Yingkow	11,000 (Japanese 10,000 Korean 1,000)
Liaoyang	10,300 (Japanese 10,000 Korean 300)
Kirin	31,000 (Japanese 1,000 Korean 30,000)

APPENDIX III

HOW THE TSINAN CLASH STARTED

(Reprinted from the *China Weekly Review*)

By *H. J. Timperley*

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Mr. Timperley, the writer of these two telegrams, is an experienced newspaperman who for a considerable time was connected with *Reuters* Peking Bureau and who covered the situation at Hankow last spring both for *Reuter's* and the *Associated Press* of America. Upon returning from his vacation in Australia last fall and winter, Mr. Timperley resigned from *Reuters* and was appointed correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* in Peking. Mr. Timperley happened to be in Tsinanfu at the time of the clash between Chinese and Japanese troops through having gone there to investigate the Shantung famine situation. He sent the two telegrams by Chinese wireless service to Shanghai in order that they might be forwarded to the *Manchester Guardian*, which was done on May 4.

These two telegrams are important because they constitute the first impartial account by a neutral witness, an experienced newspaperman as to what actually happened at the beginning of a complication which may be far-reaching in its international ramifications. The first news which Shanghai received regarding the trouble between the Nationalist troops and the Japanese at Tsinanfu was on May 3 when the Japanese semi-official *Toho* news service sent the following message to the Shanghai newspapers.

THE FOLLOWING wireless telegrams, which were received in Shanghai on Friday, May 4, from Mr. H. J. Timperley, an Australian newspaperman at Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung Province, give the best account which has as yet appeared regarding the inception of the clash between Nationalist troops and the Japanese military in Shantung. The telegrams are reprinted in the order in which they were received:

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsinanfu, May 2—The Shantung capital passed peacefully but with dramatic swiftness into Southern hands on Tuesday,

May 1, early in the morning when the Russian armored trains guarding the Northern retreating columns withdrew and a few seconds later the head of the leading Nationalist column reached the Tientsin-Pukow Railway station.

The Southern behavior has, on the whole, been exemplary. The Southerners appear to be friendly disposed toward foreigners, all of whom are safe.

The streets of Tsinanfu today were af flutter with Nationalist flags and were plastered with posters denouncing the Northern militarists. Most of the shops have reopened and the permanent population appears to be already on good terms with the Southern newcomers.

Except for a slight tension as a result of the presence of Japanese troops who are behind sand-bag barricades in certain areas of the city, the situation is generally tranquil.

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsinanfu, May 3 (1 p. m.) A serious clash between the Chinese and Japanese troops occurred this morning which was apparently the consummation of a series of

incidents including the shooting of a Nationalist officer yesterday and the detention by the Japanese of Nationalist street lecturers.

According to information obtained at the Nationalist headquarters, the news of this happening was suppressed by the Nationalists in order to avoid exciting the troops, but this morning a party of Nationalist soldiers were fired on by the Japanese when passing along the streets. The Nationalists returned the fire and a general melee ensued in which there were many casualties on both sides, including both soldiers and civilians. The extent of the casualties up to the present is unknown.

Tsingtao, May 8—The result of Japan's action in sending troops to Tsinan as an insurance against possible disturbances, if or when, the Nationalists occupied the Capital of Shantung Province, are likely to be followed by grave and far-reaching consequences. The Southerners captured Tsinan without bloodshed on the morning of May 1, the change-over occurring with a smoothness which almost suggested collusion. The Japanese troops some days previously had taken over two separate areas, including the bulk of the

Japanese shops and residences and had erected barricades of barbed-wire and sand-bags through which nobody was permitted to pass without a permit issued by the Japanese Consulate.

The Southerners disappointed all expectations to the contrary by behaving with great circumspection and showed a keen desire to avoid any appearance of anti-foreignism.

Each side claims the other began it and it is doubtful whether a most searching investigation could fix the responsibility for the initial clash. As soon as firing began, the Japanese swept the streets with machine-gun fire in preparation for replacing the barricades and also sent around armored cars. The Nationalist troops here and there replied with vigorous rifle fire, and large numbers of Nationalist troops who found themselves caught within the Japanese areas endeavored to fight their way out, and newly arrived Nationalist detachments, seeing the Japanese in action, joined in the fray. Wild rumors flew from mouth to mouth and before long a battle royal was raging which continued until evening when Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, who fairly early ordered a complete withdrawal from

the Japanese areas, succeeded in getting the bulk of his troops moving.

It is alleged that the Chinese used bombs, which probably is the case; each side claims the other used artillery. It is known definitely that the Japanese did fire several shells, but extremely doubtful whether the Chinese could have brought their heavy guns into action even had they wanted to. Each side also accuses the other of nameless atrocities. It has been established beyond much doubt that some Japanese civilians, including women, were terribly mutilated. Regarding the inevitable suggestion that the whole thing was a premeditated Communist plot, I was stationed in Tsinan at the time and I am convinced that the presence of a comparatively large armed Japanese force on Chinese soil, cheek by jowl with something like a hundred thousand Nationalists flushed with victory, created an atmosphere which rendered some kind of an explosion inevitable.

That an explosion did occur is now generally known throughout the whole world although the full extent of the repercussion cannot yet be properly gauged. It is obvious, however, that the Chinese of all classes are now siding with the Nationalists

and the situation is fast developing into a serious quarrel between one people and another. In reference to the allegations pertaining to the activities of the Nationalist propagandists, many posters were displayed in the city, but these were directed mainly against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, with a frequent suggestion that he was selling Manchuria to the Japanese. The Chinese population in Tsinan regarded the Nationalist newcomers somewhat dubiously at first, but the next day the shop-keepers began removing the shutters from their places of business and the streets of the Shantung capital were gay with Nationalist banners. It is conceivable that but for the presence of Japanese troops and the tension thus created, the occupation of Tsinan by the Nationalists might have gone off tranquilly. To the evening of May 2 the Nationalist troops were quiet and orderly and the Japanese apparently felt the situation justified the withdrawal of their barricades which were removed during the night.

Just what happened to precipitate the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese troops on the morning of May 3 probably will never be known with any certainty.

Neutral foreigners arriving at Tsingtao from Tsinan differ regarding whether the Chinese or the Japanese were to blame, but they do all agree regarding the conspicuous absence of any anti-foreignism on the part of the Southerners' general attitude. Everyone was feeling relieved that the change-over had occurred so smoothly when the Sino-Japanese clash shattered the hope that serious trouble was avoidable. The result is that the facts probably will never be known. The Japanese were carrying a chip on their shoulder and the Nationalists knocked it off," was the way one foreigner expressed the situation. It is clear that the Japanese used artillery, for a shell struck and exploded on the roof of the Ford agency in Tsinan.

THE JAPANESE BOMBARD- MENT

(Second Message)

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsingtao, May 8—Although sporadic firing and sniping continued in the Tsinan area from the beginning of May 3, heavy fighting ceased on the evening of May 4 when Gen. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew the

main body of his troops outside the Japanese zone. However, heavy fighting was renewed about 4 o'clock in the morning of May 8 following the failure or inability of the Chinese subordinate commanders Generals Fang Chen-wu and Chiang Tso-pin to carry out the Japanese ultimatum delivered to the Chinese at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of May 7. This ultimatum which was handed to the Chinese military authorities by General Fukuda, was addressed to Gen. Chiang Kai-shek and was delivered to Gen. Chiang Kai-shek's subordinate, Gen. Chiang Tso-pin, due to the fact that Gen. Chiang Kai-shek had departed on the morning of May 5 for Taianfu, which city is several miles to the south of Tsinan. The Japanese ultimatum demanded the punishment of the high Nationalist officers connected with the Tsinan incident; the disarming of all Nationalist armies which had molested the Japanese (number stated to be approximately 30,000); evacuation of the Nationalist troops from the adjacent towns of Hsinchuan and Changchiachun within twelve hours; immediate cessation of all anti-Japanese propaganda; clearing of all Nationalist armies from a zone of seven miles about Tsinan and a similar zone of seven miles on each side the night through

the east gate disguised (presumably without their uniforms). Telegraph and telephone communication between Tsinan and Tsingtao has been established. Representatives of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Tsinan informed the Japanese military headquarters this morning that all Nationalist troops had departed and in consequence requested the Japanese to discontinue their attack. The Japanese are now marching into the city and occupying the wall.

(Fifth Dispatch)

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsingtao, May 12 (1:27 p.m.) The latest Japanese Consular dispatches indicate the situation at Tsinan has become stabilized. The Japanese authorities are counselling the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other representative Chinese bodies regarding appropriate measures for the maintenance of peace and order in the native city. Passenger trains are now running daily between Tsingtao and Tsinan and postal services are being resumed. The Japanese Consulate authorities here state that the total Japanese military casualties hitherto were 40 killed and 142 wounded,

of which 67 are serious cases. There are no estimates available regarding the Chinese military or civilian casualties.

(Sixth Dispatch)

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsingtao, May 13 (4:46 p.m.)—Independent investigators report that although the Japanese assault upon the native city of Tsinan took a terrible toll due to the stubbornly resisting Nationalist defenders, it resulted in comparatively few casualties amongst the civilian population, this being attributed to the accuracy with which the Japanese artillery confined the bombardment to the Chinese military objectives.

The Japanese commander on the evening of May 10th announced a twelve-hour limit for the evacuation of non-combatants, following which he intended to turn his guns loose on the city unless all opposing Chinese troops capitulated. Discarding their uniforms, the Nationalist troops are said to have slipped out during the night in civilian clothing among the fleeing civilians. The Japanese claimed they occupied the city quietly the following morning.

(Seventh Message)

By H. J. Timperley

Correspondent, Manchester Guardian

Tsingtao, May 13 (5 p.m.)—While the Japanese disclaim any intention of establishing a military regime at Tsinanfu, the fact that Japan is sending a fresh division of troops to Shantung this week is taken to indicate some kind of military occupation is contemplated. It is believed in well-in-formed quarters here that Japan is likely to adopt the following measures: pending a settlement of the Tsinan occupation and control of the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway; secondly, the garrisoning of the Tsinan 'settlement'; thirdly, the declaration of a strictly neutral zone of ten miles around Tsinan and along the Shantung Railway through which neither Northern nor Southern troops will be permitted to pass.

The Nationalist forces have already been expelled beyond a six miles radius of Tsinanfu and the Tientsin-Pukow Railway has been occupied and cut both North and South of Tsinan by the Japanese troops to prevent the possibility of Nationalist reprisals.

A number of Americans here are planning to return to Tsinan where the situation remains quiet and where there have been no fresh developments reported. The Japanese authorities see no immediate prospects of negotiations, stating that there are no responsible Chinese authorities to negotiate with. The Japanese explain that the new division of troops arriving on May 17 is needed to protect the Shantung Railway in order to maintain communications. The Northerners still control Tsingtao and Chefoo but it is reported their troops are becoming panicky.

APPENDIX IV

Press Comments on the Shantung Affair

The following summary of American press comment was wired from New York by *The China Review's* correspondent at New York May 12 :

New York Times:—The situation in Shantung is not unlike a year ago following the Nanking outrages and the best plan of dealing with them is along the lines adopted by the British last year, otherwise sending plenty of reinforcements and then negotiating for a lenient friendly settlement. The Japanese have too much at stake in China to invite a boycott, which, with Baron Tanaka's home troubles and weak cabinet support might possibly precipitate a serious political upheaval.

New York Evening Post:—The situation between China and Japan has gone so far that a serious clash now seems inevitable.

Arthur Brisbane, Chief Editorial writer in the *Hearst Press* says:—America should mind her own business, letting Asia settle her troubles in the Asiatic way.

The New York World:—The restraint of the Japanese press is to be praised and it is predicted that Premier Tanaka will move with caution.

The New York Times publishes a dispatch from its Washington Bureau which predicts that the Japanese troops will remain in Shantung indefinitely, only withdrawing after a diplomatic adjustment has been made. The *Times* also says that there can be no American mediation of the trouble between China and Japan unless the Nationalists and Japan both request same. State Department officials refuse to state whether America would accept the office of mediator in the event such a request were received from both parties.

British Comment

The following summary of British press comment was contained in a *Reuter* message from London, dated May 7:

The new crisis in China and the possibilities of a definite clash between China and Japan is the main feature in the newspapers, which have "splashed" their news pages with despatches on the incidents in Shantung and have exhaustively discussed the subject in leading articles. Significance is

especially attached to the Northern Government joining the Southern Government in protesting against Japanese intervention.

The *Manchester Guardian* says that after the experiences of the British in China it is difficult to be very censorious over the decision of the Japanese Government to defend the lives and property of their nationals by the despatch of troops, but it may be conceived that the events at Tsinanfu will develop in such a way as to involve Japan in further and very undesirable inroads upon the sovereign and territorial rights of China.

The *Morning Post* says that Japan is involved in a struggle from which it will be difficult to extricate herself without military precautions and expense.

The *Daily Mail* says that the outrages at Tsinanfu were the result of a dangerous anti-foreign movement. British sympathy, it declares, is with Japan, and therefore strong general satisfaction will be felt that the Japanese are acting with such vigor and decision.

Another *Reuter* dispatch from London May 9, read as follows :

The papers, which continue to "splash" despatches relating to the latest events in China, dwell on the gravity of the news that fighting between the Japanese and Southern forces at that Tsinanfu has been renewed.

The Manchester *Guardian* says that the Japanese Government is apparently about to follow a belligerent policy—a policy from which the British Government shrank after the Nanking outrages. If Japan occupies Tsinanfu and most of Shantung until she obtains satisfaction and redress, the paper proceeds, she is likely to stay there indefinitely. Satisfaction and redress, it adds, are really unobtainable: one might as well demand apologies from an earthquake. The *Guardian* expresses the opinion that the results of such occupation are likely to be disastrous, more particularly, perhaps, to the Japanese, and also to the general relationship between China and the Powers.

The London *Times*, reviewing the events in Shantung in the course of an editorial in its issue of May 10 (as reported by *Reuter*) draws attention to the "altogether unexpected development.....the astonishing announcement" made by Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin, which the journal

interprets as a patriotic gesture of retirement impelled by interest and conviction; although, the *Times* declares, it is not clear whether fear of Japon or fear of communism has wrought this miracle. "The immediate problem in Shantung will be immediately simplified. The Nationalists may enter Peking and the confused development of China enters on "a wholly new phase."

In the course of an article in the *London Observer* (a Sunday paper) by "A Chinese Correspondent," the writer says that if Japan is after adventure in China there will be the spectacle of the North and South putting aside their quarrels for the time being to unite against Japan. Japan's military intrusion to China, he proceeds, is the only thing that will make the ancient people remember that they are one nation.

Japanese Comment

On the announcement in Japan that the Nagoya division was being sent to Japan *Reuter* reported that although the Japanese press refrained from definitely censuring or approving the decision to dispatch troops to Shantung a general fear was expressed lest the relations between China and Japan

might be further inflamed and they hoped that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible.

The "*Nichi Nichi*" expressed regret that the Japanese Government appeared only to have a military policy in regard to China and no diplomatic policy. It warned the Government to beware of aggravating the situation lest it should necessitate further dispatch of troops.

The *Kokumin*, attributing the Tsinan affair to General Feng Yu-hsiang's intrigues against General Chiang Kai-shek, expressed similar misgivings, especially fears of the possibility of trouble in South China.

Reuters reported on May 13 that the Japanese newspapers were unanimous in urging the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Shantung as soon as possible.

They pointed out that a gradual change of public opinion was taking place abroad regarding the despatch of Japanese troops to China and the papers generally advise that military operations should be minimized.

Comment by Foreign Press in China and Japan

(From the North China Star)

Despite her millions of armed men, China's militarism has just received a

ludicrous setback. Chiang Kai-shek hailed as a new Washington and Napoleon, entered Tsinan at the head of a victorious army of 40,000 men and there met 3,000 Japanese, who, in Chiang's words, stopped and bullied his victorious forces, took their ammunition, disarmed many and chased them from Tsinan. Then the Japanese start a military aerodrome in Tientsin against the explicit protest of China's 'Dictator,' another militarist. Therefore, there seems little hope for China in her own military power, her sole hope lying in an appeal to the League of Nations, where she would doubtless get equitable treatment. But if she goes to the League she must remember to enter the court with clean hands. Her militarists must cease fighting among themselves, clean China's international law record and send her to Geneva: otherwise they will rapidly send her to ruination.

(From the Peking Leader)

Whatever the causes may have been, the clash between the Nationalist and Japanese troops at Tsinan is certain to be followed by a furious outburst of feeling on both sides. It therefore creates what easily may prove to be one of the most serious situations in this country since the Boxer days.

As a result of that feeling many grossly exaggerated reports of what has happened at Tsinan will be circulated by both sides. Mutual recrimination also will be widespread. In these circumstances it is peculiarly necessary to exercise caution both in accepting as valid reports which may be circulated and in voicing condemnation of one side or the other. Such conduct alone will be of value in assisting to find that just and constructive solution which all should desire for the very grave problems so suddenly created.

What constitutes justice in this case remains to be seen. Deliberate and planned attack is being and will be charged by one side; deliberate provocation by the other. The whole truth cannot be known for some time. Meanwhile the course of wisdom is to reserve judgment in finally apportioning the blame.

Certain points, however, are clear.

If the attack prove to have been deliberately planned by the responsible Nationalist commanders, there can be no possible excuse.

Even if it were—as at Nanking—the work of some of the commanders in order to create difficulties for Chiang Kai-shek, it

will be hard to clear him from a large measure of blame. With the Nanking incident as a reminder, he should have made absolutely sure that nothing of the same sort could recur.

There is a third possibility—which is at least as reasonable as the second and more so than the first. This is that the trouble was in the nature of a spontaneous outbreak of anti-Japanese feeling among ill-disciplined troops. If this prove to be the case, a large measure of responsibility still rests on the Nationalist commanders. Had their troops been properly in hand, they could have prevented such an outburst—in spite of the anti-Japanese feeling of their soldiers.

Whether or not the Japanese residents would have been attacked had there been no Japanese troops in Tsinan to exacerbate the feeling of the Chinese troops will never be known. They were there; the attack has occurred—and a most serious situation has arisen. Once the trouble started, it was fortunate that the Japanese troops were on hand.

All right-minded men will feel sympathy for those who have suffered and lost their lives in the fighting, without reference

to nationality. Equally, such men will seek to know all the facts before making final judgment, judge impartially, and, above all, to turn their own minds and those of others from antagonisms toward impartial and constructive justice in solving the newly-created problems.

(From the Japan Chronicle)

Japan holds Mukden and Tsinan and can minimise or entirely prevent the advance or reinforcement of either the Northern or the Southern armies exactly as she wishes, and that without taking any visible action. She can accomplish it simply by an order holding up the trains at either point. Thus the issue of the war is entirely in Japan's hands, and whichever way it turns, it will be because Japan decided that it should turn that way. It may be perfectly true that Japan cares not a jot whether the North wins or the South, and will act from motives which take neither party's interests into consideration. But the point is that she is deciding the fate of China, and it does not improve

matters much, from the Chinese point of view, to be told that Japan cares for neither Montague nor Capulet but only for her own interests. Japanese interests in Manchuria have for long been regarded as vital. We are always told of the blood and treasure with which they were bought, not to speak of their economic necessity. Japan's interests in Shantung were, from 1915 to 1922, almost as great, but the Washington treaties apparently changed all that. However, there were considerable Japanese properties and business interests left even when the military were withdrawn and the railway and civil administration handed over. For the second time the protection of these interests has been held to justify precautions such as would be (and have been) taken in Manchuria when anything menaces Japanese interests there, from these two points the Capital can be controlled, Japan therefore, is the arbiter of fate for the Chinese factions and can secure binding agreement from both of them at the same time. Moreover, her position in North-Eastern Asia is so strong that no other State will find fault

with her actions in this region. It is only necessary to add that General Baron Tanaka, now Premier and Foreign Minister, was intimately associated with that China policy which was supposed to have come to an end at Washington.

From the Manchester "Guardian"

Commenting on the Japanese expedition to Shantung, the Manchester *Guardian* says that the Japanese are doing for Tsinan what the British did for Shanghai on the last occasion when Shanghai came within the ebb and flow of the Chinese civil war, but there is a difference in that Tsinanfu does not include any international settlement. It is the first city, goes on the paper, voluntarily opened to the foreigners, and if the presence of foreigners there is now made an excuse for sending troops and fortifying its trading quarter, the Chinese will, with some reason, wish that they had kept it closed. If the Japanese keep the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao railway open against attack, they will be acting as allies with Peking against the Nationalists, but both sides must ruefully be conscious that their mutual struggles have given Japan another

chance of establishing herself, if only temporarily, in Shantung, from which, after dislodging the Germans, she seemed most unwilling to be dislodged herself. No matter which side wins, the victor may find himself faced with the need of remobilising world opinion on behalf of the Chinese integrity, which is obviously menaced. It is unfortunately less certain than it was before that world opinion can be mobilised on her behalf if necessary.

APPENDIX V

PERTINENT FACTS ABOUT SHANTUNG PROVINCE

(Reprinted from China Weekly Review)

The province of Shantung is situated in the north-eastern part of China with a large promontory eastwards, with the Yellow Sea to the South and the Gulf of Pechili to the North. The area is about 53,000 square miles and the population about forty millions. The principal ports are Tsingtao, to the south of the promontory and Chefoo to the north of it. Mountains in the south and east of the province cover about half the area. Although many sections of the province particularly in the neighborhood of Kiaochao Bay are very fertile, the soil of the province as a whole is poor. The Yellow River, perfectly useless for steam navigation although of great length and width, frequently overflows its banks, not only devastating much property but causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of lives. As a consequence the province is relatively sparsely settled and in recent years, owing to the exactions of the military authorities, the prevalence of

famine, and for other reasons, there has been heavy emigration from the province to Manchuria. The average Shantung inhabitant is a sturdy, tall individual, and the Shantung coolies have a deserved reputation as excellent manual laborers. The most valuable units of the Chinese labor corps in France during the world war were composed of Shantung coolies. For the last twenty or thirty years there has been much seasonal migration of coolies from Shantung to Manchuria, the coolies departing in the spring and returning in the late autumn. But a large proportion of the present emigrants from Shantung are remaining in Manchuria permanently.

Traversed by Two Railways

Shantung province is traversed by two railways the Tientsin-Pukow railway running north and south and the Shantung railway, built by the Germans and at present in Japanese possession, running east and west from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, where it joins the Tientsin-Pukow line. Thanks largely to German initiative the more fertile parts of the province are being intensively cultivated, particularly in the production of peanuts, of which there is a large export from the province to all parts of the world,

America included. Another industry which the Germans developed was the weaving of straw braid from wheat stems, and the export of this article is being constantly increased. In later years, under the guidance of American tobacco companies and instructors much tobacco is being raised in the province. Abroad, however, Shantung is best known as being the home of Shantung silk, also known as pongee silk or raw silk. The tan of the pongees and the rough texture is due to the worms feeding on oak-leaves instead of the finer mulberry. Salt, which is a government monopoly in China, is also produced in great quantities in Shantung, the salt being evaporated from sea water. Much of the salt produced along the coast of China is of a yellow color, owing to the sea water not being clean, but the salt produced on the Shantung coast is of excellent quality, and both the Germans and the Japanese when they were in possession of the Kiaochao district greatly developed the salt industry. The export of salt from China has been forbidden from time immemorial, but the Japanese made a hard fight at the Washington Conference on this subject of salt, and eventually it was agreed that China was to buy back the Japanese salt fields as a fair valuation and that a reasonable amount

of salt might be exported from China to Japan.

Unlike many of the provinces in the Yangtsze valley Shantung has not a network of canals running through it, although the Grand Canal, which joins the Yellow River near Tsinan, is an important water way. Transportation, in Shantung is generally overland, by cart and wheelbarrow. instead of, as for example in Kiangsu province, by boat.

Coal Mines in Several Areas

Coal mining is carried on in various parts of the province, the most important field being that of Yihsien, in the southern part of the province, worked at Tsaichuang by the Chung Hsing Coal Company. The mine is connected by rail with the Tientsin-Pukow railway and also with the Grand Canal at Taierhchuang. The capital of the company is at present three and a half million taels. In a normal year about a quarter of a million tons of coal are produced, but operations in recent years have been much hampered by military exactions. These mines are located within a few miles of Lincheng, where five years ago bandits held up the night express train on the

Tientsin-Pukow line and took about a score of the passengers prisoners. Mines are also worked along the Shantung railway at Tzuchuan, Fangtze and Chinlingchen. These mines were developed by German initiative, and under the terms of the Washington Conference they were turned over to a company formed under a special charter of the Chinese Government, with a provision that the amount of Japanese capital should not exceed that of Chinese capital.

Shantung, from a historical, sentimental and tourist point of view, is famous as being the birth place of Confucius and containing the sacred mountain of Taishan. Chufu, located on the Tientsin-Pukow railway 300 miles south of Tientsin, is where Confucius, the great Sage of China, was born and where he is buried. It is sometimes described as the Mecca of Confucianism. The town is surrounded by a wall four miles long, and a third of its area is taken up with the temple of Confucius and the residences of his lineal descendants. Adjoining the temple is the home of the present lineal descendant, the 74th in succession from Confucius, Duke Kung, a youth of about ten years of age. Confucius

was born 551 years before the Christian era and his teachings have been the basis of Chinese culture for more than two thousand years. The sacred mountain of Tai-shan, near which is located the Ti-miao temple, is located at Taian, a town south of Tsinan, and the scene of fighting between northern and southern troops at the end of April. The summit of Taishan is 6,000 feet above sea level. It is revered by the Chinese because Emperor Shun offered sacrifices to Heaven there in the 23rd century before Christ.

APPENDIX VI

SOME JAPANESE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TSINAN INCIDENT

Translation of General Fukuda's Letter of May 7, 1928

General Fukuda's letter (ultimatum?), of May 7, 1928, was handed to the Nationalist military officer in the walled city of Tsinan for transmission to General Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief, presenting five demands. The letter, in translation, reads as follows:—

“In spite of your repeated declarations regarding protection of foreign lives and property in China, the troops under your command have done, to my deep regret, unfortunate things. Leaving the questions of indemnity, apology, etcetera to be negotiated and settled by the Imperial Japanese Government, in future, for losses sustained by both the Japanese residents and troops in Tsinan and for damages inflicted upon the good name of the Japanese Empire, I hereby beg to present the following demands:

1. Severe punishment of all high military officers who are connected with the incident.

2. Disarming, in the presence of Japanese troops, all Nationalist soldiers who have offered resistance to the Japanese troops.

3. Strict prohibition of anti-Japanese propaganda in the territories under the control of the Nationalist Army.

4. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from the 20 li (about 7 miles) zone of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway and the 20 li radius of Tsinan itself.

5. Evacuation of Nationalist troops from the military barracks at Changchuang and Hsinchuang within twelve hours.

“Your answer to the above demands must be delivered within twelve hours.”

**Translation of General Chiang's
Reply to Fukuda's Letter
of May 7, 1928**

Upon receipt of General Fukuda's letter of May 7, 1928, which did not reach General Chiang Kai-shek until May 8th, the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief sent

Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui and Mr. Lo Chia-lun as his representatives to negotiate with the Japanese officer for a peaceful settlement of the Tsinan affair, together with a note in reply to the five demands presented by the Japanese. In this connection, it is pointed out that before the Chinese representatives reached the Japanese military station, Japanese troops had commenced their bombardment at Tsinan. The two representatives were roughly handled by the Japanese troops both on their way to and while at the Japanese military station. The attitude of General Fukuda himself was so unreasonable that the Chinese representatives were refused any discussion concerning the Tsinan affair. They were asked to carry back another letter to General Chiang, saying that military action had already commenced.

The reply to General Fukuda's communication of May 7, 1928, reads, in translation, as follows:

1. Punishment will be duly meted out to those Nationalist soldiers who disobeyed my orders and failed to avoid the present Sino-Japanese misunderstanding. But guilty Japanese troops, who committed the same offense should be similarly dealt with.

2. Stern measures have already been taken to suppress anti-Japanese propaganda in the Nationalist area, with a view to preserving the friendly relations between China and Japan.

3. Nationalist troops in the 20 li zone along both sides of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, have been ordered to continue their Northern Expedition, and this area will temporarily be freed from our soldiers, but the Railway line should be available to military transportation. Further, the Nationalist army should not be interfered with both in their offensive and defensive measures which they may adopt against the northern troops. Also, suitable detachments are to be stationed in Tsinan, which is the capital of Shantung, in order to maintain peace and order and afford general protection to a place where there are so many public interests.

4. The Railway Station of the Tientsin Pukow Line is of vital importance for military transportation, and the Nationalist army will keep an appropriate number of armed men at this point in order to give protection to the station and maintain order.

5. The troops stationed at Hsinchuang and Changchuang have been ordered to march to the fighting front, and the military barracks at these places will, therefore, for the time being, not be used to station troops.

6. All Nationalist officers and soldiers held and disarmed by the Japanese shall be released and their arms and munition returned immediately.

Translation of Fukuda's Letter of May 8, 1928

General Fukuda's Letter of May 8, 1928, was handed to General Chiang Kai-shek's representatives who were sent to negotiate with the Japanese officer for a peaceful settlement of the Tsinan affair but with whom General Fukuda refused to negotiate. The following is a translation of the letter :—

“You are hereby notified that, as up to four o'clock this morning, we received no formal reply from you to our demands handed to your representative here yesterday at 4 p.m. requiring to be answered within twelve hours, we have already taken decisive action in order to display our military strength and prestige and to carry out our

plan, believing that you were not sincere in seeking a solution of the affair.

Translation of Fukuda's Order

The following is a translation of an order issued by the Japanese Commander, General Fukuda, on May 4th, 1928 commending his soldiers. A copy of this order was obtained at Tsinan. It indicates that the Japanese military action in Tsinan was premeditated.

“During the recent outbreak, you, officers and soldiers, did not lose a single second in carrying out orders issued to you, I feel exceedingly satisfied with your bravery shown on every occasion and ability to overcome numerically superior forces, thus proclaiming our military glory and fulfilling duty of protecting our nationals. Meanwhile, my heart is filled with profound sorrows for those warriors who have given up their lives for performance of duty.

“A careful examination of your activities during the recent outbreak reveals that you were able to see opportunity through trivial matters and to handle the situation with autocratic resolution. I am gratified that the training given you in

ordinary times has produced the desired result.

“As our movement has many ramifications and must not be considered as an isolated move, you should keep abreast with general situation and refrain from taking rush actions. However, in order to display the military strength of our nation, you should take decisive action in dealing with anything interfering with our movement and impairing our military prestige.

“Hereafter you should pay due attention to this point and redouble your loyal effort in carrying out the important mission of our military expedition to China. While present situation gives signs of a possible peaceful settlement, you should not, by any means, be optimistic for the attainment of our object. You should be aware of our mission and be constantly encouraged.

Dated May 4, 1928.

Signed Masataro Fukuda

Commander Sixth Division of Japanese Expedition to Shantung.”

Proclamation
(Translation)

It was previously declared that both the Northern and Southern Chinese soldiers

are not permitted to break into the twenty li (7 miles) radius of Tsinan and 20 li zone along both sides of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, for the sake of safety to the City and the Railway.

Hereafter, the peace and order of those districts now evacuated by the Southern Chinese troops will be effectively preserved by Japanese soldiers who, being well disciplined, will not cause any dismay to the people. The local force will temporarily be responsible for the preservation of peace and order in the city of Tsinan.

Citizens of Tsinan are hereby notified and urged not to get excited but to go on as usual with their occupations.

Masataro Fukuda,

Commander of Japanese Forces.
Tsinan, May 12, 1928.

Proclamation

(Translation)

Tsinan being now occupied by Japanese troops, neither Northern nor Southern Chinese soldiers will be permitted to enter the twenty li (7 miles) radius of Tsinan. Any Chinese soldier who enters the said area

without permission from the Japanese commander will be immediately disarmed.

Masataro Fukuda,

Tsinan Garrison Commander.

Tsinan, May 20, 1928.

Japanese Memorandum Handed to Chinese Authorities

In addition to the portion of the declaration which was handed to the press, the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai handed to the Nationalist Foreign Minister a separate memorandum similar to the one which the Japanese Minister in Peking, Mr. Yoshizawa handed to Marshal Chang Tso-lin. This memorandum was approximately as follows :

1—If Marshal Chang Tso-lin will cease fighting and return to Manchuria immediately, the Japanese will exercise their good offices to prevent the Nationalists from advancing further northward than the Great Wall.

2—If Marshal Chang Tso-lin insists upon fighting and is defeated, the Japanese will take steps to prevent his defeated troops from returning to Manchuria.

3—In case Marshal Chang Tso-lin accepts the Japanese proposal for returning to Manchuria without further fighting and in future will cease meddling in the politics of China outside of Manchuria, the Japanese will not offer any resistance to his resumption of power in Manchuria. But in the event Marshal Chang Tso-lin should violate such an understanding, the Japanese will take steps to deal with the situation.

THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE TSINAN INCIDENT

(Submitted by the Japanese Government on May 28th, 1928, to the Secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva for information of countries belonging to the League)

1. On January 3rd, 1927, Chinese rioters, instigated by extremists, made an attack in great force on the British Concession at Hankow, and, defying British efforts to hold them back, occupied it. A similar outrage was repeated at the British Concession at Kiukiang on January 6th, 1927. (What bearing has this paragraph upon the Tsinan Incident?)

The Southern Army entered Nanking on March 24th. Communist troops belonging to it attacked the Japanese Consulate and subjected the Consul, members of his staff and Japanese residents to indescribable insults and also inflicted bodily harm upon them. The Communist troops looted the Japanese Consulate and almost all the houses of Japanese residents so completely that practically nothing was left in them. Similar or even more serious outrages were committed on the Consuls of and residents belonging to other countries, and British and American warships were compelled to open fire as a protective measure. (Irrelevant)

On April 3rd, in the Japanese Concession at Hankow, a gang of rioters, who, at the instigation of Communist agents, had been attempting to provoke disturbances, began by purposely insulting and striking a Japanese seaman who happened to be ashore. They proceeded to attack Japanese shops and to injure Japanese passers-by. The situation became so critical that most of the 2,500 Japanese living in the Concession left for Japan.

In view of such incidents transpiring alike at Nanking and Hankow, the Japanese

residents at Chungking, Ichang, Shasi, Changsha, Wuhu, Kiukiang and other places on the Yangtze began to quit those places.

On December 11th a collision occurred at Canton between Communist and non-Communist groups of Chinese troops, and did not come to an end until the 13th. Fortunately, foreigners in the Concessions sustained no harm; but it is to be noted that the cruelty, pillage and massacre (including that of women) which distinguished this fighting among the Chinese troops themselves defied all description. Even after the fighting was over, efforts were made to wipe out the so-called Communists, some 200 being daily arrested. They were summarily shot, without any formality, at three places in the city which were made to serve as execution-grounds for the occasion. The total number of people thus put to death is estimated at 2,500. (Irrelevant to the Tsinan Incident.)

2. The above instances constitute only a few, and the most glaring, of the incidents that have occurred in China during the past year. The state of affairs which for the last few years has prevailed in that country is, broadly speaking, of a piece with them. Since the First Revolution civil wars have

continually followed one another, and have made it difficult for any peace and order to be maintained at all. During the last few years the activities of the Communists have rendered the general conditions still more disturbed. At present the situation is such that foreign residents cannot depend, for the protection of their lives and property, on the Chinese authorities alone. It is inevitable, therefore, that Japan, a country contiguous to China, the interests of which are profoundly involved and many of whose people live there, should, if occasion should require, endeavour to safeguard her people and her vested rights by her own exertions on the spot.

3. When recently the Southern Army commanded by General Chiang Kai-shek was advancing northwards from Nanking in the direction of Tsinan, Japan dispatched her troops (Is this act lawful?) to Tsinan for the protection of 2,000 Japanese residents there. It need scarcely be said that this dispatch of Japanese troops was a measure of self-protection (?) rendered unavoidable by the above-mentioned state of affairs prevailing in China.

In spite of this precautionary measure taken by Japan, some Southern soldiers

looted a Japanese house (where?). This outrage originated the whole incident. The Southern troops then at Tsinan proceeded to attack the Japanese forces and residents at various places. (Who started the clash first?) They murdered over a dozen Japanese residents including women, and plundered over a hundred Japanese houses. It is to be sincerely regretted that these outrages compelled the Japanese troops to resort to force for the protection of the Japanese residents.

If it should be thought that the present deplorable incident would not have occurred but for the dispatch of Japanese troops to Tsinan, such a view would obviously be erroneous in the light of the above-mentioned incidents at Hankow and Nanking, occasions on which no foreign troops were present.

4. The present dispatch of the Japanese troops is for no other purpose (?) but to protect the lives and property of Japanese residents, and implies nothing approaching an interference with the military operation of any of the Northern or Southern forces, and the troops will be withdrawn (when?) as soon as the necessity for their continued presence ceases to exist, as was announced by the Japanese Government at the time they were dispatched.

When a disturbed state of affairs came into existence at Tsinan last year, the Japanese Government dispatched their troops to that district in June in order to afford the necessary protection to Japanese residents. As soon as the situation became such that the presence of the Japanese troops was no longer required, they were recalled, their complete withdrawal having been effected by September 8th. (Have they been withdrawn yet?)

5. The following is a resume of the Tsinan Incident:

a. The Japanese troops, which arrived at Tsinan between the latter part of April and the 2nd May, 1928, established as the object of their protection an area containing about 80 per cent of the (which?) Foreign Quarter, which constitutes the principal place of abode for Japanese, and erected defence works at two points therein. (There is no foreign settlement in Tsinan.)

On the other hand, following the withdrawal of the Northern troops from Tsinan on April 30th, the Southern troops began to arrive on May 1st in large numbers. By May 2nd the number of the Chinese troops in the Foreign Quarter (?) and within the Walled City had exceeded 70,000.

General Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, who arrived on May 2nd, proposed to the Japanese Commander that, as the Southern Army would by all means ensure the maintenance of peace and order, the Japanese troops might speedily withdraw, and the above-mentioned defence works be removed. Accordingly, the defence works were removed on the night of May 2nd, and some of the Japanese residents who had gone to places of safety returned to their homes.

b. On May 3rd, at 9.30 a.m., the house of a Japanese by the name of Chohei Yoshifusa, was looted (?) by regular soldiers belonging to the Southern Army. About 30 Japanese soldiers commanded by a lieutenant hastened to the scene. The plundering Chinese soldiers had fled to the neighbouring Chinese barracks. (who did the first firing?) From these barracks they fired on the Japanese soldiers, some of whom were wounded. The Japanese then responded to the fire.

On the outbreak of this collision, the Southern troops, with which Tsinan was crowded at the time, almost simultaneously began, at various points, to fire on the Japanese troops, to massacre the Japanese

residents (How many Japanese were killed in comparison with the Chinese casualty list?) and to plunder Japanese houses.

c. The Japanese troops endeavoured to afford shelter and protection to the Japanese residents, and also to drive the Southern troops out of the Foreign Quarter (?) or to disarm them.

In the face of much danger the Japanese Consul contrived on several occasions to get into touch with the Chinese, and endeavoured to bring about the suspension of hostilities. As, however, the Chinese troops continued firing, probably because the orders of General Chiang Kai-shek to the contrary were not obeyed, hostilities were not discontinued until the afternoon of the 5th.

d. At that time, 4,000 Chinese troops still remained within the Walled City of Tsinan, while the number of those in the neighbourhood ran into tens of thousands. They dug trenches round the Foreign Quarter (?). On the neighbouring hill guns were in process of being placed in position, directed on Tsinan.

If hostilities had been permitted to be opened by the Chinese in such circumstances

the Japanese troops and residents would have been placed in extreme jeopardy. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for the Japanese troops charged with the protection of the Japanese residents to force the armed Chinese troops to leave Tsinan and the Shantung Railway without delay. On the 7th, at 4 p.m., the Chief Staff Officer of the Japanese troops demanded (By what right?) that the Chinese troops should withdraw to a limit of 20-Chinese-miles (i.e. about 7-English-miles) from Tsinan and from either side of the Shantung Railway. He also demanded the disarming of the Chinese troops who had committed outrages on the Japanese troops and residents, and the punishment of the responsible officers. A reply was to be given within 12 hours. (This note did not reach the Chinese commander until the next day.)

Not only did the Chinese fail to comply (what for?) with the demand, but their troops assumed a even more threatening attitude. On the 8th, the Japanese troops set about clearing the locality. By the 9th they had driven (?) the Chinese-troops around Tsinan to points outside the approximate limit of 20-Chinese-miles.

e. On the other hand, the Chinese troops within the Walled City of Tsinan, including "un-uniformed soldiers", kept firing on the Japanese troops and on the Shantung Railway trains. On the afternoon of the 8th the Japanese troops endeavoured to disarm them by pacific means, but they would not be persuaded.

In consequence, early in the morning of the 9th, the Japanese troops bombarded (By what right?) the points d'appui of the Chinese troops, such as the offices, within the Walled City, of the Tuchun (Military Governor of the Province) and of the Taoyin (District Governor) and the Walls, and at the same time took all possible means to induce the Chinese troops to get away and escape. As a result, early in the morning of the 11th, the greater number of the Chinese troops changed into plain clothes and escaped from within the Walls. Thus, except for the "un-uniformed soldiers" in ambush, the Chinese troops were driven outside the 20-Chinese-miles limit.

f. According to particulars ascertained up to May 15th, 14 of the Japanese residents were killed by Chinese troops in the present disturbance. Most of their bodies (including those of women) bore marks of having been

subjected to inconceivably brutal acts of the most revolting character. Fifteen others were wounded. (How about the ruthless murder of more than 1000 Chinese men and women by the Japanese?) Various men and women were subjected to indescribable insults before the public gaze. The number of the Japanese houses looted is 131.

g. With regard to the story of the alleged murder of Mr. Tsai Kung-shih, "Shantung Commissioner for Foreign Affairs", and of the members of his staff, which is bruited abroad by the Chinese it may be remarked that, on the outbreak of the disturbance on May 3rd, the Chinese troops and "un-uniformed soldiers" fired indiscriminately at the Japanese, whether soldiers or civilians, from within all and any buildings where they could find a foothold. In fact, their fire from the Commissioner's Office (which was not known to be such by the Japanese troops engaged in fighting in that quarter) killed two Japanese soldiers. In the evening of the same day, part of the Japanese troops went on patrol. Over a dozen Chinese, who were lurking inside the Commissioner's Office, suddenly opened fire on these Japanese soldiers, who could not but respond to the fire and overpower them.

Whether these included Mr. Tsai is not known. (More explanation is necessary.)

It need scarcely be stated, however, that the Japanese troops would never in any case kill a single non-resisting Chinese citizen(?). Still less need it be said that the allegation regarding the "cutting off of nose and ears" is simply impossible, (why impossible?) from the very nature of the character and habits of the Japanese people.

6. The following points call for special attention in a survey of the circumstances attending the Tsinan Incident :

a. The unfortunate incident owes its origin to the fact that Southern soldiers looted the house of a Japanese resident, (?) and that they fired on the Japanese soldiers who went to the rescue. (?)

b. Before the incident occurred, the responsible officers of the Southern Army repeatedly declared that they would assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order, and demanded the removal of the Japanese defence works. The Japanese troops removed their defence works on the night which, it so happened, preceded the outbreak of the disturbance, and some of the Japanese residents, who had gone to places of safety, returned home.

c. The incident occurred immediately after the Japanese defence works were removed. At the moment that happened the Chinese troops, simultaneously began to attack the Japanese troops and to outrage and plunder the Japanese residents. This outrage and plunder were almost entirely confined to the Japanese. (Can this be proved?)

These circumstances produced the impression that the disturbance was designedly brought about by the Chinese, at least by the lower classes among them.


d. In the face of much difficulty the Japanese repeatedly established contact with the Chinese and arranged for the suspension of hostilities. (Did they?) On each occasion, orders failed to be obeyed on the Chinese side, and hostilities had necessarily to be continued. (More explanation needed.)

e. As the Chinese troops, including "un-uniformed soldiers", fired indiscriminately under cover of any houses they could find, the Japanese troops had to engage in street fighting in the most difficult circumstances. (Yet so few casualties among the Japanese troops?)

f. The brutalities which the Chinese soldiers committed on some of the resident

Japanese men and women immediately after the incident occurred are so cruel that description of them is impossible. (How about those committed by the Japanese?)

g. It is alleged that the limit of twelve hours attached to the demand which was made by the Japanese Commander on the 7th gave the Southern Army scarcely any time for consideration. It must be noted, however, that at that moment the circumstances were so urgent that the Japanese Commander was convinced that, if there were any delay, sharp practice on the part of the Southern troops would find its opportunity and place not only the Japanese residents but the Japanese troops themselves in the most dangerous position. (why send the ultimatum at all?) His precaution was but natural (?) in view of the faithlessness hitherto manifested on the Chinese side.



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
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